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PREFACE

The project undertaken is essentially tracing the
difficulties and frustrations of Hew Zealand, as she des
perately endeavored to defend herself against the threat of
an invasion by Japan*

It is not intended to be an all-

inclusive survey of New Zealand during the war years, but
covers only diplomatic and governmental procedures concern
ing defense*

Within this framework of events is a descrip

tion of a Dominion torn between intense loyalty to Great
Britain and the need to sever many of these bonds in the
Interest of self-preservation*

It is a study of a country

attempting to embark upon a course of national self-interest
but finding that it cannot break a tradition cherished for
over a century*
This thesis would never have been attempted, much
less completed, without the guidance and encouragement of
Dr* A* Stanley Trickett, Chairman of the Department of
History at the University of Omaha*

1 would also like to

thank the graduate faculty of the Department of History for
allowing me to do my graduate work tinder their direction*
Deepest gratitude to Miss Ella Jane Dougherty of the Omaha
University Library, whose patience and skill in locating the
iii

ir
needed research material made this thesis passible*

Finally*

a special thanks to Harlan Nelson who typed this thesis
under nest difficult circumstances*
Riverton* Wyoming
December, lf€?

Allen U n | t
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CHAPTER I
PREPARATION FOR WAR
New Zealand, a eountry of* limited strategic Importance
and geographically isolated from the rest of the world has
maintained unusually strong ties with the mother country,
Great Britain.

This tenacious relationship, at a time when

the other Commonwealth countries valued independent action,
has led some historians to describe the attachment as a
"mother complex.
Cultural and economic bonds with the mother country
led New Zealand, prior to World War II, to be only passively
interested in Asian affairs but vitally concerned with Europe
and its troubles*

The distance from Europe and limited

knowledge of events in Asia gave New Zealand, before 1931 *
a sense of security*

She saw no need for home defense and,

in fact, at every Imperial Conference from 1919-1933 had
been told that in the event of war, she should send food and
men to Europe-— just as she had done in World War I. 2

The

1

Louis Vasserman, "The United States and New Zealand;
Political and Commercial Relations" (unpublished Ph.D. dis
sertation, Dept, of History, University of California, 19^®)*
p. 264. Hereafter cited as Wasserman, "The United States
and New Zealand."
^Frederick Lloyd Whitfield Wood, The New Zealand
People at War; Political and External Affairs (Wellington:
War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 195®)* P»
59. Hereafter cited as Wood, Political and External Affairs.
1

2

sudden rise of Japanese power, however, caused the Dominion
to question this policy.
At the Imperial Conference of 1933 much discussion,
for the first time, centered around the new threat in Asia
and the possibility of Japanese expansion into the Southern
Pacific.

To protect her Empire, Britain decided that the

naval base at Singapore should be heavily fortified*

3

In

case of an emergency the Royal Navy would move to Singapore
and use it as a base to protect the Commonwealth*

Plans were

also Biade for an elite Commonwealth force composed of troops
from all the Dominions to be stationed in India during peace
and moved to Singapore if war should come. 4
New Zealand delegates left the conference determined
to press for expansion of defenses against possible Japanese
aggression.

Hard hit by the economic depression, agrarian

New Zealand had cut its defense budget from £901,000 for the
fiscal year 1930-31 to £685,000 for 1931-32 . 5

The preoccupa-

tion of the Imperial Conference with Japan in 1933 1 however,
prompted a somewhat reluctant Parliament to increase the
In 1926 the New Zealand Parliament voted one million
pounds to be used to help build Singapore. The last install*
sent was paid in 1936. For more information see G. R.
Powles (ed.), Contemporary Hew Zealand (Wellington and others:
Whitcombe and Tombs, Ltd., 1 9 3 8 /, p . 249* S. D. Waters, The
Royal New Zealand Navy (Wellingtons War History Branch,
Department of Internal Affairs, 1956), p. 10. Hereafter
cited as Waters, The Navy.
^Wood, Political and External Affairs, pp. 60~6l.
^New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCXXXV1 (1936),
538.

3
defense budget from approximately £ 7 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 9 3 2 - 3 3 to
£790,000 for 1933-34* 6

Plans were made for a coastal defense

system, constructed over a period of six years at a cost of
7
£1,000,000 and an Imperial Defense Committee was formed to
survey New Zealand resources and plan for any emergency that
might arise . 8
Hysteria over the Japanese did not exist for long*
It was easy to rationalize that densely-populated Japan with
pressing economic problems must inevitably
expandinto
China* 9 This, coupled with the fact that New Zealand, a land
of few natural resources, had just concluded a trade agree
ment with J a p a n , m a d e New Zealanders feel that there was
little reason to fear the "Land of the Rising Sun*"

In fact,

during 1933 the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff declared that war
with Japan was possible, but suggested that such a war was
much more likely to result from economic causes than from
direct aggression* 11

The Chiefs added that relations with

Japan were currently stable enough to allow for continuation
of plans to send an expeditionary force to
6 Ibid.
8 Ibid..

Europeevenlarger

7 Ibid., p. 555.

p. 5 5 9 .

Wood, Political and External Affairs. p. 64.
10Bernard K. Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific
Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I960), pp. 63-64*
11

Wood, Political and External Affairs, p* 62; Gordon,
New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power, p 7 o 7 *

k
than that which was sent in World War X«

1o

Thus at the end

of* 1935, New Zealand *& military planners were thinking
chiefly of possible war in Europe and the Dominion's reaction
to the same as a loyal member of the Commonwealth*
Complete reversal of this policy occurred when, in the
last months of 1935, the labour Party gained control of the
government*

The new Cabinet had neither experience nor had

they been briefed on foreign affairs*

Gradually they became

aware of the actual threat of Japan and not only increased
defense expenditure but also started a program to enlarge
military forces* 13 Total expenditure for the Armed Forces
increased from slightly over £ 1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in 1 9 3 5 -3 6 to
El,526,000 for 1936-37 . 1 4

Efforts were made to enlarge all

branches, but particular emphasis was placed on the Air Force
as the major defense against invasion* 15
The new Government, in matters of foreign policy,
attempted to break a long tradition of allowing Britain to
dictate the Dominion's position in world affairs*

Interest

in the League of Nations, which had been waning in the former
administration, now became intrinsically involved in all
policy considerations*

The Labour Government believed that

security in the Pacific as well as security of the entire
12

^
Gordon, New Zealand Becomes ja Pacific Power, p. 76•

*^Wood, Political and External Affairs, p* 6 3 *
14
New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLX (1938), 384*
1 5 Ibld., CCXXXVI (1936). 546.

5
British Empire depended on the League*

16

With this in mind

the Dominion became one of the strongest exponents for
League action, 17 and in the remaining years before the war,
on several occasions, directly opposed Great Britain*®
policies in relation to both European and Asiatic countries*
This was indeed a departure from the docile New Zealand of
previous years*
The independent attitude of the Labour Government,
however, did not receive the united support of all people*
Many New Zealanders thought it ridiculous for a small country
with Inexperienced politicians to oppose the tried statesmen
and diplomats of Great Britain*

To these people an indepen

dent policy seemed even more absurd when viewed in the light
of the Dominion*® total reliance on the mother country for
defense* iS Other people saw the Japanese threat as being of
no great significance*

In a speech before the House of

Representatives on August 19, 1936, F* Jones, Minister of
Defense, stated that the danger, in the opinion of experts,
was "• * * a raid by a cruiser or an armed merchantman or the
16

Ian F* G. Milner, New Zealand* s Interests and Poli
cies in the Far East (New York: Institute of Pacific Rela
tions, 1937)* P * 83* Hereafter cited as Milner, Policies in
the Far East *
17 Gwendolen M. Carter, The British Commonwealth and
International Security; The Role of the Dominions, 1919-1939
(Toronto s The Ryerson P r e s s 1947*77 P* 259*
1Q
Horace Belshaw (ed*), New Zealand (Berkeley, Califor
nia; University of California Press, 1947)* pp« 306-30?•

6
laying of mines near our coast,”

He added that Mthe esti

mate of the size of the Force that would be landed in New
Zealand • • • /would b©7 two hundred* • • •

The presence

of Singapore would stop any fleet from invading New Zealand
because the cost would be greater than the gain* 20
The heated criticism of Labour defense policy cooled
when Japan launched her Invasion of China in 1937*

Invasion

of Manchuria, in 1931* had been viewed somewhat passively*
but the current invasion now caused definite public reaction*
Newspapers generally concluded that this attack was indeed
unwarranted aggression*

21

Longshoremen and dock workers* in

complete agreement with the newspapers* began an unofficial
boycott of Japanese goods by refusing to handle any imports
or load any ship from the Asiatic country*

Farmers generally

opposed any official restrictions placed on Japan

22

but this

did not deter the Government from making the various proposed
defense plans more concrete*
The Imperial Conference of 1937 was of tremendous
help in guiding the defense planning of the Labour Government*
New Zealand delegates * at the conference, displayed grave

.

19New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates. CCXXXVI (1936),

560

20

Wood, Political and External Affairs, p* 64*

2 *Milner, Policies in the Far East * p« 107•

oo

n
Gordon, New Zealand Becomes ja Pacific Power, pp* 8990; Wood, Political and External Affairs, p. o5*

7
concern over the protection Britain could offer if the threat
became a real invasion*

At the opening of the conference

Prime Minister Michael J • Savage stated:
I fully realise that the Dominion which I have the
honour to represent is both small and distant, and
that we can hop© to play only a modest part in the
deliberations of the conference or indeed, the af
fairs of the world* Nevertheless we hold definite
views on many of the subjects that this conference
has been called to consider • « •
it will be my
function to express those views as cogently, indeed
as forcibly, as 1 can*
New Zealand did play a major part when the conference began
discussing Commonwealth policy in the Pacific*
Prime Minister Savage frankly told the members of the
conference that his country had doubts about the protection
New Zealand would receive if Britain faced enemies in both
Europe and Asia* 24 He flatly stated that if Great Britain
were pressed, she would give very little assistance to his
country.25

He suggested a Commonwealth body be established

to determine what forces were needed and where they would be
4.
sent*

2^Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol« XII (Re
ports, Vol. VIII) CMD 54 I 2 , October, 1937* HImperial Confer
ence 1937* Summary of Proceedings," 57*
24 Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power, p p • 77-----------------------------------78.
2^Wood, Political and External Affairs, p • 67*
Gordon, New Zealand Becomes ei Pacific Power, p* 7 8 *

8
The British delegation denied that they would ever
neglect the Pacific Commonwealth countries and reassured
New Zealand that naval strength as of 1937 could handle any
possible emergency*

They added that Singapore was being

fortified to warn the Japanese that Britain had not forgot
ten her obligation in the Pacific.
Prime Minister Savage, in a speech made after he re
turned from the conference, declared ” . * * if we defended
New Zealand alone we could not develop sufficient strength
28

to pull a herring off a gridiron.”

Despite the emphasis

Savage placed on collective security, the conference con
vinced New Zealanders that more reliance must be placed on
their own defensive measures*

Skeptical of British reassur

ances, Parliament voted to expand the defense budget to
£1,561,986 for the year 1937-38— an increase of £300,000
over the previous year.2^
Although all three services enjoyed the defense budget
Increase, most of the activity centered around the Air Force
2^Ibid*, pp* 78-79• The dedication of Singapore naval
base was held February 14, 1938* The base had the largest
dry dock in the world, the largest floating dock in the
world, and enough fuel stored for six months normal fleet
operation* The base was fortified with huge guns with an
estimated range of forty miles and the islands around Singapore
were also fortified* For more information see "Gibraltar of
the Far East," Literary Digest, January 29* 193®» PP* 8-9*
pQ
"New Zealand," The Round Table, December, 1937* P •
202 *

2^New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLI (1938),
384*

9
and Army.

Construction of air bases was proceeding at a

rapid pace; torpedo bombers bad been purchased and plans were
laid Cor long-range bombers manned by full-time men. 30 The
Army, consisting of over 8*000 poorly-trained reservists,
planned to protect ports, repel enemy raiding parties and
train new recruits. 31 To stimulate enlistments, a three32
month vocational and training program was inaugurated.^
Expansion for the Navy was in the form of two modern light
cruisers on loan from Great Britain. 33
Labour officials had always assumed that in event of
war the Navy and the Air Force would immediately come under
British command.

Contrary to the views of the former adminis

tration, however, no plans were made for use of the Army in
Europe, as had been done in World War I.

34

In fact, on

October 2@, 1937, the New Zealand Government made it clear
30
Powles (ed.), Contemporary New Zealand, pp. 25^-255*
^Wood, political and External Affairs, p. 69* As of
1938 the regular Army included 8 4 officers and 200 other
ranks. The Territorials (National Guard) consisted of 8,290
men. New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCXXXVX (1930)*
255 *
32Powles (ed.), Contemporary New Zealand, p. 252. The
draft had been discontinued in 1 9 3 0 *
33Waters, The Navy, p. 13. The two ships were of the
seven thousand ton class. All the officers and half the men
were from Britain, but New Zealand was responsible for all
the financial aspects connected with the ships* Also see
Powles (ed.), Contemporary New Zealand, p. 250.
34Powles (ed.). Contemporary New Zealand, pp. 262 - 2 6 3 *
J . V • T. Baker, The New Zealand People at War*Twe 11 ington:
War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1965),
P. 31.

io
to the British that they would not promise an expeditionary
3e
force if a European war occurred.
Although Government officials generally agreed that
expansion of the military forces was necessary, a sharp con**
troversy arose over the ultimate size and goal of the defense
forces.

Defense Minister F. Jones* in a statement on May 17 *

1938 1 argued that 9*000 men was an adequate army during this
time of peace.

He added that a total of 7 *^00 men were now

serving* of which 41 per cent had been recently trained.

The

Defense Minister*s optimistic statement on military strength
was completely discredited on the following day when four
Army Colonels stated that defense preparations were completely
inadequate•^
The opinion of the Colonels was supported by C. A*
Berendsen* permanent head of the Prime Minister's department,
37 that if
who Informed the newly*organized Council of Defense*"
war occurred* little assistance would come from Great Britain
for months and probably even years.
3 <5

38

The Navy spokesman at

Gordon, New Zealand Becomes ja Pacific Power * p. 8 8 .

36
Wood* Political and External Affairs, p. 70. The
four Colonels were placed on the retirement list for breach
of military ethics.
*^Baker* The New Zealand People at W a r , p. 31. This
was a cabinet sub-committee, organized in 1 9 3 7 to advise in
defense preparations•
^^Wood* Political and External Affairs t p. 67*

IX
the Council M. • • agreed that the British fleet might not
come to Singapore for an indefinite p e r i o d * T h u s ,

by

the end of 1 9 3 $, there seemed to be a split among both
civilian and military authorities over matters of defense*
Military planning, although proceeding at a rapid pace, lacked
direction and leadership*
New Zealand for several years had wanted a conference
with Great Britain and Australia dealing exclusively with
problems concerning the defense of the South Pacific*

She

had always felt that there needed to be increased cooperation
with Australia and also a clarification of defense procedures
between the two Pacific Dominions and the mother country* 40
Now, with dissension in New Zealand over long range defense
planning, a conference seemed imperative*

After a great deal

of persuasion, Australia and Britain finally agreed to meet
in Wellington, New Zealand*
The Pacific Defense Conference met from April 14-23,
1939* 4l

The topic of the conference centered around Pacific

relations and defense*

More specifically, discussions were

held on enemy action in the Pacific before the British fleet
would arrive, how large enemy attacks would be, and the probable amount of damage that would occur from these attacks* 42
39» i d .
97.

40 Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power * p p • 96~
4 lIbid., p. 9 6 .

Ibid.. p. 9 8 .

12
A majority of the meetings, however, dealt with the naval
base at Singapore as the basic defense against Japanese
aggression*

Great Britain reassured the other members that

If war broke out she would come to their aid regardless of
the severity of the European crisis* 43 New Zealand remained
very skeptical of these reassurances, but there was little
that she could do to influence Great Britain’s defense
policy* 44
Further discussions were held on the probability of
defending the smaller islands in the Pacific.

New Zealand

delegates maintained that if the islands surrounding their
country were to fall into the hands of the Japanese, New
Zealand would be subject to air attacks*

It was decided

that, due to the impossibility of protecting all islands,
only the most strategic in relation to Commonwealth defense
^Wood, Political and External Affairs, p* 76• Less
than a month before the conference, the British Prime Minis
ter sent a telegram to the Prime Minister of Australia stating
that the sis&e of the fleet at Singapore would depend on when
Japan entered the war and also on the losses sustained by
Great Britain, as well as her opponents* J • R* M* Butler,
Grand Strategy, Vol. II, September, 1939—-June, 1941, in His
tory of the Second World W a r , United Kingdom Military Series,
edited by J. H* M* Butler (London: H. M. Stationary Office,
1957), p« 326* An Admiralty report at this same time also
stated that it would be 1 8 0 days after the outbreak of war be
fore any relief would arrive at Singapore* Wood, Political
and External Affairs, p. 67*
44 According to Gordon, British military leaders had
dealt with New Zealand defense shortly before the conference*
They stated that it would be in New Zealand's best interests
to help reinforce Singapore. New Zealand Chiefs of Staff
agreed but hesitated to send men out of the country when they
believed every man was needed for defense at home* Gordon,
New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power, p* 6?•

13
would be fortified*

The other islands would have to rely
on their own defenses until help arrived* 45
^
Xn relation to long-range planning, the problem of
deployment of supplies was discussed*

Hew Zealand complained

that it was difficult to obtain materials since she was
totally reliant on Great Britain*

Australia could not help

because she could barely meet her own defense requirements*
Suggestions were made to solve the problem but little else
was accomplished* 46
Probably the most concrete proposal that came from
the conference was Britain* s insistence that Hew Zealand step
up her program of training men for home defenses*

It was

strongly implied that those men could also serve in other
places if need be*

Though this was a conference on Pacific

defense, the British hinted that an Expeditionary Force might
still be sent to Europe* 47 To help New Zealand, Major-General
P* J* Mackesy, chief British military delegate at the confer
ence, remained in the Dominion to report on the state of
defense preparations* 48
In an interview held after the conference had ended,
Prime Minister Savage reported that the dominant view at the
end of the conference was the desire of the three nations to
^ I b i d *, pp. 100-101? Wood, Political and External
Affairs, p. 79.
^ W o o d , Political and External Affairs, p. 7 8 *
4 7 Ibid.

4 ®Ibid., pp. 7 9 -8 0 .

14
1&Q

cooperate in defense•

He added:

HWe know what the con*

ference asks us to do, and our Job is to push on with it to
the utmost with the principals concerned."50
Prompted by Britain's insistence that defense prepara*
tions be expanded, the Labour Government immediately issued
a call for able men to volunteer for the Army* 51 This first
call seemed to pass unnoticed by the public, so, a month
later Prime Minister Savage issued another appeal to all men
between the ages of twenty and fifty-five.

Savage informed

the public that the Army needed 6,000 men and added that men
ages twenty to thirty-two with no military experience should
volunteer for the Territorials; men between the ages twenty
and fifty-five with some military experience should volunteer
for the Reserves. 52 Chief of General Staff, Major-General
J. £• Duigan, in an interview, related that a force of 21,000
^ T h e Evening Post (Wellington), April 2, 1939, p* 10*
5 °Ibid., April 2 6 , 1939, p. IO.
5 1 Ibid., May

15, 1939, p. 15.

52Xbid.. May 23, 1939, p. 8, and May 24, 1939, p. IO.
The Reserves were divided into three classes of men. Class
I consisted of men twenty to thirty-five years of age with
two years military experience. They were to train thirtysix
hours per year. Class II consisted of men thirty-five
to fifty-five years with some military experience. They
were to meet four times a year. The third class consisted of
men of the same age only with no military experience. They
were to work with engines and other special equipment. For
more information, also see New Zealand, Pari lament ary Debates,
CCLIV (1939), 8 3 2 .

15
men would be the goal of the expanded Army* 5 3

Enlistment,

however, did not come as fast as officials expected*

By

the end of July there were only 8 9 8 officers and 11,017 meii
in the Territorials— New Zealand's first line of defense*

54

The lack of enthusiasm for volunteering led to another
political crisis over the means of raising an Army*

Sir

James Parr, a former member of the Imperial Defense Council,
declared that New Zealand needed a force of 40,000 or 50,000
men to defend herself*

He contemptuously proclaimed that

the Army was fortunate if they could field a force of 5*000
aea*^

Parr, along with many other people, advocated conscription as the only effective means of raising an army* 56

Prime Minister Savage, although admittedly disappointed with
the lack of volunteers, announced that there was no need for
conscription*

He declared that he did not want men to come

into the Army with the threat of war on their minds*

He

then pronounced, ” 1 am not asking them to go abroad*

X want

them for the defense of New Zealand in New Zealand*" 57
^^The Evening Post (Wellington), May 2 6 , 1939, P • IO*
5 Ibid.. July 20, 1938, p. 8 . On July 26, Defense
Minister Jones announced the regular Army would be increased
to 6 0 0 men with a comparable Increase in staff and artillery
corps* Ibid*, July 2 6 , 1939* p* 12.
5 ?Ibld.. April 29, 1929. p. 25-

56
<%
^ Ibid*, June 8 , 1939* p* 9» The most outspoken con
scription advocate was the Defense League* This organization
began in 1 9 3 6 , and counted many influential parliamentarians
among its members*
5 7 Ibid., p. Ik.

16
Despite the preoccupation over the adequacy of the
Army, definite progress was made in other branches of de
fense— especially the Air Force.

Construction of new air

bases continued at a rapid pace.

Plans were made for an Air

Force composed of four squadrons and 310 planes 9 with a
standing reserve of 5 * 0 0 0 men to be used in case of emergency.

58

By the end of July, 1939* it was reported that the

Air Force had increased fifteen*-fold in men and twenty-fold
in machines over the Force of 1935*

59

Beyond the expansion of ports and port facilities,
little was done in relation to the Navy.

The Navy knew that

when war was declared, whether it be Bast or Nest, it would
immediately become part of the British Royal Navy .**0
Total engrossment over defense preparation was momentarily interrupted by the Tokyo Agreement. 6 l The appeasement
policy of Great Britain toward Japan was received with mixed
feeling in New Zealand.

The Reverend A. H. Nordmeyer, member

of the House of Representatives, bitterly denounced it as an
’•Eastern Munich.”

He cried that the present British policy

was M• * • calculated to disrupt the Empire and in the long
^^Milner, Policies in the Far East, p. 100.
^^The Evening Post (Wellington), July 28, 1939* P • 10.
**°Wood, Political and External Affairs, p. 6 8 .
61

For more information on the Tokyo Agreement see E.
L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds.), Documents on British Fore i m Policy (3rd Series? Londons H. M. Stationary Office,
1959-61). XX, 304-305.

17
run to bring us into a disastrous war!"

62

The concessions

given to Japan did not concern New Zealand as much as the
fact that she was not asked to participate in making the
decision.

The agreement was officially announced in New

Zealand a day after it had been published in the Press*

New

Zealanders remarked that "If there was a Commonwealth policy
63
In the Pacific, New Zealand had no hand in shaping it."
Opposition to the Tokyo Agreement was not, however,
64
unanimous* Acting Prime Minister Peter Fraser,
stated
that his Party was in complete accord with British foreign
oolicv.^

The Evening Post (Wellington) added that Britain

could not handle Japan alone and since none of her allies were
interested in helping, the mother country had no choice but
to appease Japan* 66
Throughout the end of July and into August, defense
build-up proceeded at a frensied pace*

The defense budget

for the fiscal year 1 9 3 9 * announced during the first week in
August, was increased £1,115,169 over the previous year* Of
__
67
this increase £o87*715 was given to the Army*
Minister of
^Sfilner, Policies in the Far East, p. 91*
^Belshaw, New Zealand, p* 308*
64 Fraser was assuming office in place of Savage who
was quite ill at the time•
^ M i l n e r , Policies in the Far East, p. 91*
The Evening Post (Wellington), July 26, 1939* P * 10*
^Ifoid*, August 2, 1939* P* 7*

18
Defense Jones reported that the Territorials, although only
partially t r a i n e d , were adequate to defend New Zealand, and
the Air Force had enough bombers to stop any Japanese fleet* 68
During the last days of August, however, the threat
of the ’’yellow peril” was all but forgotten*

The Evening

Post (Wellington) relegated the war in China to several small
columns on the back pages to make room for the details of the
German Invasion of Poland*

The deterioration of relations

between Germany and Great Britain caused New Zealand to com
pletely realign herself with British foreign and defense
policy*

To show the mother country that the Dominion stood

by her side, Fraser announced that messages had been sent as
suring Great Britain that she had the full support of New
Zealand— whatever the outcome* 69 That same day, September 2,
Fraser proclaimed a state of emergency and Defense Minister
Jones mobilized the small standing Army*
At nine-thirty P* M * , September 3* 1939* only a few
hours after Britain, New Zealand also declared war* 70
^ I b i d *, August 20, 1939* P« 10.
69

GGNZ to SSDA (information concerning the initials
appears in the Appendix) in New Zealand* War History Branch*
Department of Internal Affairs, Documents Relating to New
Zealand* s Participation in the Second WorlcTwar (3 vols* ?
Wellington: War History Branch, Department of Internal Af
fairs, 1939-63)* Document 3* September 2, 1939* I* 2. Here
after cited as Documents* Also see The Evening Post (Welling
ton), September 2, 1939* P* 10*
70GGNZ to SSDA, and SSDA to GGNZ, Documents 9, 10, and
11, September 4, 1939* in Documents, 1 , 6 -8 * New Zealand did
not take the official step to declare war but asked Great
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Within four day® the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs
telegraphed the Governor-General of Hew Zealand outlining
Britain's needs*

New Zealand was to send one of her light

cruisers to Britain immediately! the other was to stay and
prevent attacks from armed raiders* 71 Great Britain also
wanted specialists of all kinds to enlist in the British
Army, and, if possible, a contingent of the Hew Zealand Army
to serve in France*

The Secretary made it clear that the

possibility of sending part of the Army would be based on
New Zealand's estimate of Japanese neutrality* 72 In a reply
dated September 13, 1939# New Zealand stated that she would
try to meet all previous requests of the mother country*
She would, further, take the matter of sending troops under
consideration and would be guided by the advice of the United
73
Kingdom*
Thus, after completely realigning herself with Britain,
it was only a matter of time before troops would be sent*

On

November 7, 1939# after talks with the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff and the War Office Staff in London, it was
decided that the situation in Japan was stable enough to send
Britain to Inform Germany that Hew Zealand was also at war*
Also see The Evening Post (Wellington), September 4, 1939#
P* 11 •
71
SSDA to High Commissioner for the United Kingdom
(Wellington), Document 24, September 8 , 1940, in Documents,
I. 17.
72Ibid.. pp. 18-19.
SGNZ to SSDA, Document 25, September 13, 1939> in
Documents, I, 21-22*
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the first echelon of slightly over 6 *000 troops— the core
of New Zealand 1a trained array* 74
74
' Fraser (London) to the Prime Minister of Mew Zealand*
Document 46* November 11* 1939• in Documents, Z, 36* Britain
asked for a full division but Mew Zealand did not have this
large a force of men in combat readiness* The Dominion prom
ised to send men in three installments or echelons of
approximately 7 * 0 0 0 men per unit*

CHAPTER II
WAR EFFORTS AND ATTITUDES
Preparation for the forthcoming Centennial Exhibition
occupied the minds of many New Zealanders in the closing
months of 1939*

The decision to send troops overseas had

been made, but since the war was 1 2 ,0 0 0 miles away, there
seemed to be little need for concern about war strategy or
defense problems**

The Government, while not encouraging

this complaisant attitude, contented itself to appealing to
the people to make greater economic sacrifices and begged
the young men of the country to volunteer for the service*
The first months of the new year saw little change in
this attitude*

The Government continually reassured the

country that there would never be conscription of men for
the armed forces because, in Prime Minister Savage's words,
"• * * to compell men by law to defend their country is, in
effect, to deny the existence of one of their strongest and
noblest instincts*" 2

With this as a guiding policy, daily

appeals for volunteers were made*

New Zealand men must fight

*The Evening Post (Wellington) in November and Decem
ber, 1939, reported little news of the war and even less on
New Zealand defenses and the training of men for the first
echelon*
2 Ibid.. January 29, 19^0, p. 6 .
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to protect Britain* for if the mother country fell and could
not buy exports, New Zealand, also, would fall*

3

Recruit

ment seemed to go quite well*

By the time the first echelon
arrived in the Middle Bast in February, 4 the second was in

the process of training and Minister of Defense Jones had
long since begun another campaign for men to join the third
echelon* 5 By sending the best of her young men overseas
and increasing production, especially of food products, New
Zealand felt that she was doing her share to combat Nazi
aggression*

This attitude -lasted until the German blitz

krieg erupted.
Germany invaded the Lowland Countries and Norway
during April and May, 1940, and by June 1, the British
Expeditionary Force was being evacuated from the European
continent*

Struggling France, invaded by Italy, soon fell•^

Within a few short months German troops were looking across
the English channel at unprepared, frightened Britain*
The fall of France and the threat of a United Kingdom
Invasion led to repercussions in the Pacific*

Commonwealth

^Ibid*, January 4, 1940, p* 8 *
4General officer commanding New Zealand Expeditionary
Force to Minister of Defense, Document 71, February 19, 1940,
in Documents, I, 59*
^The Evening Post (Wellington), January 11, 1940, p* 7*
^New Zealand dutifully declared war on Italy at 10:30
A* M . , June 10, 1940, to correspond exactly with the British
declaration* GGNZ to SSDA, Document 16, June 10, 1940, in
Documents, I, 11-12*
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defenses in this area were shattered because Britain needed
every available man and scrap of equipment to protect her
shores*

Japan, aware of this glorious opportunity to expand,

laid plans to strike against the powers that had stifled her
dreams*

7

'The formerly inexcitable attitude of Mew Zealanders
toward the war was shaken to the very foundations by these
events*

In a telegram, dated June 14, the new Prime Minister,
Peter Fraser, S was informed that, due to the fall of France,
Great Britain could not adequately defend her Dominions from
q
Japan and therefore must rely on America for help*
The
next day the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, sent
another unreassuring telegram outlining the dilemma Britain
faced* 10 Finally realising that this war was not a duplicate
of the Great War, Mew Zealand began remodeling her defenses*
One of the earliest measures for defense was the pas
sage of the Emergency Regulations Amendment Act*

The original

bill, passed on September 13, 1939* gave the Government power
7Oliver A* Gillespie, The Pacific (Wellington: War
History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1952), p* 9*
8
Prime Minister Savage died on March 27, 1940* Peter
Fraser was then asked to form a government* See The Evening
Post (Wellington), March 27* 1940, p* 10*
9This was a note for the Prime Minister, not published,
reviewing the European situation* Documents, III, 206n»
^ W i n s t o n S* Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. II:
Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co*, 1949)*
pp. 194-196• Hereafter cited as Churchill, Their Finest Hour*
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to control price% prevent profiteering and provide for public
safety* 11

An additional amendment, copied after a similar

British act, was now passed giving the Government power to
take any steps necessary for the successful prosecution of
the war* 12

The Government did not have to consult Parliament

on each step taken, but merely had to table in the House of
Representatives the regulations it had made* 13 The full ex
tent of these emergency regulations was voiced by Fraser
when he stated, Hth@ only right and decent thing to say is
that all the resources of the country, every man and woman
and every coin of money and every ounce of property must be
placed at . . . /the Government•«7 disposal for . . . dofense*H14 People generally approved of this tremendous
advance in power, but an editorial in The Evening Post
(Wellington) voiced concern that such tremendous authority be
placed in the hands of only one political party*

A national

government, as Britain had, would be more representative of
all the people* 15
The Evening Post (Wellington), September 4, 1939•
p. 1 1 .
^■2New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVXI (1940),
96* Also see The Evening P o s t (Wellington), June 14, 1940,
p* 8«
*^HNew Zealand ,*1 The Round Table, July, 1940, pp* 943--------------14
James Thorn, Peter Frasers New Zealand*s War Time
Prime Minister (Londons Odhams Press Ltd* , 1952), p. 179*
Hereafter cited as Thorn, Peter Fraser♦
15
The Evening Post (Wellington), June 19, 1940, p* 6 .
944.
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The Labour Party, aware of these and similar senti
ment s , had been endeavoring to reach an agreement with the
National Party for such a government#

A Council ot Defense

had been formed in 1937* but offers to seat opposition mem
bers were immediately rejected since it was only one branch
of the Government# 16 The National Party was noisily de
manding a voice in determining the direction of the entire
country#

They continually reminded the Labour Party that

the war effort lacked direction; besides, with one party in
power not all people had a voice in determining a direction# 17
To remove this criticism of the Government, Fraser
proposed a War Council of fifteen members representing industry, labor, commerce,18 and both major political parties# 199
The Council's duties would b e :
to determine the steps to be taken in all matters of
defence, all matters connected with the giving of
military assistance to Great Britain and her Allies,
afl4 all matters connected with production of goggs,
and the rendering of services for war purposes#
The opposition, again flatly refusing the offer, stated that
such an organization was cumbersome and would lead to
16 J. M# S. Ross, Royal New Zealand Air Force
(Wellington: War History Branch, Department ofInternal Af
fairs, 1955)* p# 44# Hereafter cited as Ross, Air Force#
*^Wood, Political and External Affairs, pp# 131-132.
18 Proposed membership was six members from the Execu
tive Council, three opposition members, two men from primary
industry, one farm union representative, two labor repre
sentatives, one secondary industry representative, and one
member from the Returned Soldiers League# See New Zealand,
Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940), 171*
1 9 Ibld., p. 1 6 8

20Ibid., p. 2 8 7 .
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confusion, 21

Fraser, however, on June l 8 t formally announced

the organization of a War Council without opposition mem2O
hers
hut made it known that members of the National Party
23
were welcome anytime they wanted to join*
Further efforts to quiet political unrest was a pro
posed War Cabinet of five members— -three Labour and two
National— to act in cooperation with the War Council*

The

duties of this Cabinet would be "* • • to consider and
determine all matters relating to the Second New Zealand
Expeditionary Force, His Majesty's Naval and Air Force and
24
home defence*"
Adam W* Hamilton, Leader of the Opposition,
again refusing to join, stated that since the proposed
cabinet did not deal with production, finance, or man power,
it had limited use* 25 Sharp debate followed this refusal
which lasted for several weeks*

Finally on July 16, Fraser

announced that an agreement had been reached whereby two
opposition members would join the War Cabinet* 26

Under the

agreement, production for war, war finance requirements, and
any other matter concerning the war were placed on the agenda
for the Cabinet's consideration* 27 New Zealand now had a

21Ibid., p. 168.
22

The Evening Post (Wellington), June 18, 19^0, p • 9*

23Ibid.. p. 8 .
24

New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVXI (19^0),

168.
25Ibid.. pp. 168-169.
27Ibid.

Ibid.. p. 512.
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Parliament, general Cabinet, a War Cabinet and a War Council
o fi

to conduct the operations of the country.
The first problem on the agenda of the newly-formed
War Council was that of conscription* 29 The Labour Govern
ment, as well as the general public, had been opposed to any
form of conscription during the first year of the war*

The

fall of Prance, however, changed the attitudes of most people
from complaisancy to favoring a full preparation of New
Zealand for a greater war effort* 30 First indications that a
conscription law might be introduced came on Hay 26, when
Prime Minister Fraser hinted that the people might have to
place themselves and their money in the service of the Government* 31 This hint did not come as a surprise to the people*
Several members of the Labour Party had been advocating conscriptlon 32 and businessmen*a associations demanded that the
Government Institute some sort of policy* 33
^
28
One author contends that most of the war effort prob
lems were handled in the War Cabinet without party interest
or publicity interfering with the decisions* See Wood,
Political and External Affairs, p* 171.
Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940),
212-213.
^°Baker, The New Zealand People at W a r . pp* 81 and 449.
^Thorn, Peter Fraser* pp* 177-178* Fraser had led
militant protests against conscription in World War 1, and
had been arrested and Jailed for his subversive activities*
For his World War I activities see Ibid*, pp* 36-47*
32
Chief among the Labour Party advocates for conscrip
tion was Edward L* Cullen from the Hawke *s Bay area* See New
Zealand, Parliamentary Debates* CCLVII (1940), 2 6 5 •
•^T h e Evening Post (Wellington), May 22, 1940, p* 11*
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On June 19* Fraser stated that the War Council, rather
than Parliament f would decide on the matter of compulsory
military service*

He argued that the Council was composed

of men with the experience to handle this question— one that
was much too detailed for Parliament* 34 The War Council *
with unusual efficiency, passed a series of recommendations
on June 22*
1*
2*
3*

These weres

All males nineteen to forty-six must register*
Selection for service be restricted to single men*
Territorials be brought up to war establishment and
the standards be the same as the 2nd New Zealand
Expeditionary force*
Voluntary enlistment, with the exception of the Air
Force* cease July 22*
Only men twenty-one to forty-one should be taken for
overseas service; this included men serving in the
Territorials*

4*
5*

From these recommendations a conscription procedure
was organized and administered by the National Service De
partment*

Hen were conscripted from the General Reserve of

all males over age sixteen*
divided into three divisions*

Those eligible for service were
The first being single men

eighteen to forty-five; the second being married men eighteen
36
to forty-five; and the third— all other men*
The men,
after an examination, would be divided into four medical
classes*

Class 1 was fit for overseas service; Class XI was

fit for service only in New Zealand; Class III was fit for
^ N e w Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940),
212-213.
^ T h e Evening Post (Wellington), June 22, 1940, p. 12*
^ N e w Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940),
251.
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would be garrisoned by men too young for the Expeditionary
Force, returned soldiers too old to go overseas, by men
without any previous military service, or those unlit lor
43
the Expeditionary Force*
Mounted troops as a delense lorce were also being
considered by the Government*

In a speech in the House ol

Representatives, C« A* Wilkinson, member ol Parliament,
charged that the Government had turned down the services ol
lourteen or lilteen hundred horsemen*

He remarked that Hew

Zealand, with its extensive coastline, was not in a position
to turn down the services ol anyone*

Mounted troops, ac

cording to Wilkinson, would be most helplul because ol their
mobility and their ability to live oil the land*

44

Alter a

series ol debates about the elliciency ol such troops and
their ability to light a modern war, it was publicly an
nounced that nine mounted units would be lormed lor New
Zealand delense*

45

Even with the rapid build-up, the armed lorces were
still inadequate*

This lact was made undeniably clear by

Frank Langstone, Minister ol External Allalrs, in a speech
belore the House ol Representatives*

He stated that 21,000

men were already serving with the Expeditionary Force and
4 3 Ibid., June 10, 19^0, p. 11.

44
New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940),
352-353^^The Evening Post (Wellington), July 16, 1940,
p. 1 0 .
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more would be needed*

Many of these men were taken from

Territorial ranks and could not be replaced until after the
entire Expeditionary Force had been trained*

Thus It would

be at least two or three months before any type of force
could be trained adequately for the defense of New Zealand* 46
The anxiety and nakedness New Zealand felt after the
fall of France was Increased by the deterioration of Japanese**
British relations*

On June 26, Britain Informed the Dominion

that Japan was about to ask the United Kingdom to close the
Burma Road*

Because the United States was eminently involved

In supplying China, Britain first asked the Americans what
help they would offer in this crisis* 47 The British felt
there were two answers to the problem*

One was to close the

Road for three months to any large freight volume like that
which had passed over the road the past year; the second was
to negotiate a general settlement in China*

Xf the British

Government was to take any stand against Japan, they would
hope that the United States would Join in trying to negotiate
a general settlement and also transport a part of their
Pacific fleet to Singapore as a show of unified force* 48
46

the

New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CChVII (1940),

250-251.
^ S S D A to GGNZ, Document 1, June 26, 1940, in Docu
ments. XIX, 1-4.
48
Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols*;
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948 ), I, 897 and 900*
Hereafter cited as Hull, Memoirs* Also see SSDA to GGNZ,
Document 2, July 2, 1940, in Documents, XXX, 5*
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American Government replied that sending a force to Singapore
would leave the Atlantic uncomfortably open.

They added that

strong economic pressure was already being applied on Japan;
besides, the United States did not believe in giving concessions to a country at the expense of a third power. 49
Such a rebuff of hopeful joint action between the United
States and Britain left the latter very little choice.

Oh

July 11, after consulting her Dominions, Britain announced
that the Burma Hoad would be closed for the three months
during the rainy season. 50
New Zealand did not like any thought of making con
cessions to Japan.

While talks between the United States

and Britain were in progress, the Dominion informed the
mother country that she fully agreed with the decision to
get a clear-cut definition of policy from the Americans, but
she felt that Britain should show a measure of confidence in
her relations with Japan— rather than conciliation and weak*
ness. 51 On receiving word that the Burma Road was closed,
the New Zealand Government voiced apprehension over the pos
sibility of alienating the United States and bluntly added
. . we neither understand nor sympathize with the policy
4 9 Hull, Memoira. I, 897-898.

SSDA to GGNZ, Document 5, July 11, 1940, in Documents, III, 10-11. The Burma Road was closed from July 17
to October 17*
^*Tbid., Document 3» July 3* 1940, pp. 8-9#
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that has been adopted vis-a-vis Japan* • • •

To soften

these remarks the Government added that they did not mean
to add to the difficulties of the United Kingdom ”. • . whose
decision on this difficult matter we have accepted in the
53
past and will no doubt accept in the future*”"
To New Zealanders the Far Eastern situation looked
very grave, so bleak, in fact, that when the Government re
ceived notice that troop carriers were on their way to pick
up the third echelon, 54 it was apprehensive about releasing
them*

This decision proved difficult*

If the third echelon

was sent, the country would be entirely denuded of a fullytrained army*

A long coastline and many harbors made the

country particularly vulnerable to attack, and with untrained
men and few arms she would be easy prey*

On the other hand,

it was felt that, since the war was not in the Far East, the
Dominion would stand or fall according to decisions being
made in battles at the main theaters of the war. 55 After
long deliberation, it was decided that the troops must be
sent to supplement the first echelon in Egypt so the New
Zealanders could form a fighting force in the Middle East.

56

52GGNZ to SSDA, Document 8, July 30, 1940, Ibid., 15*
53Ibid.
5^SSDA to GGNZ, Document 223, July 30, 1940, Ibid*,
I, 169*
33GGNZ to SSDA, Document 224, August 3t 1940, Ibid.,
171-173*
^ I b i d . The second echelon had been, despite the
protests of the New Zealand Government, diverted to England

34
Troops that were to act as reinforcements would be held
back, however, and dispatched to the Fiji Islands to organ
ize a front line defense there.57
The telegram Informing Britain of the decision to
send the third echelon had Just been sent when the Prime
Minister received a message stating that the British Com
bined Chiefs of Staff were preparing a report of the Pacific
situation.

Churchill, In the telegram, announced that If

Japan declared war on the British Empire* an early attempt
to Invade Australia or New Zealand was considered unlikely*
Xt was believed that Japan was either too occupied in China
or would seek out the rich prizes offered by the Netherlands
East Indies*

Furthermore, if Japan did move in the direc

tion of the South Pacific Dominions, the long lines of comsunication would make Invasion extremely hazardous* 7

If

the Pacific Dominions were threatened, Churchill added, all
to help repel the expected invasion* They arrived June 21,
and were not expected to join their twin in the Middle East
for some time* It was hoped that the third echelon would
increase the size of the Middle East force enough to make
it an efficient fighting unit* For more information on the
second echelon see GGNZ to SSDA, Document 129, May 2, 1940,
Ibid*. 98.
*^GGNZ to SSDA, Document 224, August 3* 1940, Ibid*,
171*173. The troops held back numbered 3*050* This meant
2 8 7 officers, 53 nurses and 5,791 other ranks departed for
the Middle East*
58
^ SSDA to the High Commissioner for the United King
dom (Wellington), Document 2, August 11, 1940, Ibid*, III,
17.
59Ibid.. p. 18
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available British ships would move from the Mediterranean to
the Far East*

He went on to outline the state of British

defenses in an effort to show Hew Zealand that the United
Kingdom was continually growing stronger* 6 0
The next day* the New Zealand Government received the
report entitled "Appreciation by the United Kingdom Chiefs
61
of Staff on the Situation in the Far East, August, 19^0*,f
The first part of the report stated that Japanese advances
in Southern China and Hainan, the situation in Indo-China,
the development of communications and air bases in Thailand,
and new long-range aircraft increased the threat to Malaya,
which the arrival of a fleet could only partially protect.
The fall of France, the threat to Britain, and combating
both the German and the Italian Navy made it almost impossible
for the British to even send a fleet to the Far East*

62

The report next dealt with possible invasion points*
It was estimated that Japan might attack British possessions
with Malaya and Singapore as her first target*

Under this

assumption, New Zealand and Australia would be threatened,
but not until Japan had consolidated her gains both in China
and Malaya*

"The Rising Sun" might also decide to penetrate

Indo-China and Thailand in a move west, or might attack the
6°Ibid.
SSDA to the High Commissioner for the United King
dom (Wellington), Appendix XV, August 12, 19^0, Ibid*, 5^0552.
Ibid.. p. 5%0.
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Butch last Indies*

Another possible invasion point was the

Philippines, but this was considered unlikely since Japan
would not want to incur the wrath of the United States.63
To carry out an attack on any of these probable tar
gets, it was estimated Japan had ten battleships, three to
seven aircraft carriers, with the necessary number of des
troyers and cruisers, six to ten divisions of men available,
213 carrier-borne planes, and 432 land-based aircraft* 64
To combat such a force, Britain had in the Far East a small,
inadequate fleet,

eighty-eight first-line aircraft, and a

handful of m e n * ^
If Japan should strike at Malaya— and at this time it
seemed obvious that they would do so— the British would need
the help of the Dutch*

With the combined forces of the more

modern Netherlands Pacific air and sea forces, a stronger
defense of the Far East could be made* 67 The cooperation of
the Dutch was not a certain fact, however, nor were the
British sure they would help if the Netherlands' Indies were
attacked*

Throughout the report it was stated in emphatic

63Ibid.. pp. 5^3-545.
Ibid.. p. 543.
65
«
Ibid*, p* 552* Britain had one o-inch cruiser, one
6-inch cruiser, six armed merchant ships, five old destroyers,
and a number of smaller vessels*
Ibid*, pp* 550-551. Of the eighty-eight aircraft,
about half were obsolete* There were nine British batt&lions
stationed in Malaya*
Ibid.. pp. 550 and 553- The Dutch had 144 firstline aircraft, two cruisers, seven destroyers and sixteen
submarines at their disposal*
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terms that any cooperation with the Netherlands was only an
assumption* 68
This rather bleak outlook of Far Eastern defenses was
soon followed by an announcement that Japan had signed a
pact with Germany and Italy*

The tripartite agreement

was aimed at the United States but an ominous threat to the
British Empire could not be mistaken*

Telegrams, sent daily

to New Zealand, Informed her of the situation and stated
that if the United States went to war with Japan, the United
Kingdom might follow. 70 The Government replied that, if
the United States found themselves at war as a result of
concerted action with the British Commonwealth over Issues
in the Far East, the Commonwealth should most certainly join
America in declaring war* 71
Xt now appeared to the New Zealand Government that
any month might mean invasion with few trained men to stop
the invader*

Efforts to increase home defenses received

Ibid., pp. 548-551.
Go

F* C* Jones, Japan*s New Order in East Asia. 1937k5 (London and others: Oxford University Press, 1954), p*
199• Hereafter cited as Jones, Japan*s New Order* The Pact
was signed September 27, 19^0* See also SSDA to GGNZ,
Document 17, October 3, X9%0, in Documents, XXX, 28-29•
^°SSDA to the High Commissioner for the United King
dom (Wellington), Documents 19 and 20, October 8, 19^0, in
Documents, XXX, 31.
^ G G N Z to SSDA, Document 21, October 9* 19^0, Xbid*,
31.
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renewed vigor*

It was announced that changes would he made

so that the Territorials could be mobilized more rapidly*
This group of men was to be expanded as rapidly as facilities
could be arranged to train them; 40,OOO to 50,000 m e n , in
cluding reinforcements for the Expeditionary Force, was the
72
training goal for the near future*
Minister of National
Service, Robert Seraple, also announced that a Home Guard,
composed of men not eligible for Territorial or overseas
service, would be created 7 3 and taught the basics of combat
as well as the geography of their own country*

As these men

progressed in training, their duties would be beach patrols,
guarding vital points, making maps of areas not outlined by
the regular Army, and, if invasion did come, would oppose
enemy landings in isolated areas until mobile Army units arrived.7 4 The Home Guard would be equipped with weapons not
used by the Army*

The acute shortage of equipment meant

that all men would not have rifles, but it was hoped that by
the end of the year this problem would be alleviated* 75
^ T h e Evening Post (Wellington), October 7% 1940, p* 8*
73
Ibid*, October 3, 1940, p* 13* The Home Guard was
modeled after a like organization in Britain* New Zealand
already had a Military Reserve which received some training,
but this new organization largely overshadowed it* It was
conceivable, however, for a man to belong to both— -as did
many returned soldiers* This confusion was not ended until
February, 1942, when the National Military Reserve was in
corporated into the Home Guard* See The Evening Post
(Wellington), February 4, 1942, p* 6*
^^Tbid., December 3* 1940, p* 5*
75Ib±d
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In addition to the increase in the Army* The Emer
gency Precautions Scheme (EPS) and the Women's War Service
Auxiliary (WWSA) were also organized* The EPS, though not
an entirely new organization, 76 was expanded to receive all
people who could not join the armed forces*

The organiza

tion's duties were taking care of the wounded, fighting fires,
transportation, sanitation, and other civil defense duties*
The WWSA would do much the same thing only in a more limited
sense *77
Concentration on building mine sweepers was the goal
of the Hew Zealand Wavy*

A German raider had mined several

approaches to Auckland Harbor in June,

and at this time,

there were only four over-aged fishing trawlers used as
sweepers* 79
' The Government, therefore, embarked on an ex
tensive program that ultimately resulted in adequate mine
sweeper protection* So
^ N e w Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940),
99 —lOO• Organized ujider the Defense Act of 1909 v the EPS
was under civilian control until an invasion would automat
ically place it under Army command* See also Nash, A
Working Democracy, p* 88* Nash states that the EPS was or
ganized in 1931*
^ N e w Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLVII (1940),
100* See also The E v e n i n g P o s t (Wellington), October 3,
1940, p* 13.
^Waters, The Navy, pp* 119-120, also 170*
dred twenty-eight moored contact mines were laid*

Two hun

79Ibid., p. 193*
An
Ibid*, p* 176. Between October, 1940, and the end
of the war, New Zealand built thirteen sweepers at a cost
of E 7 8 0 ,0 0 0 .
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The German raider in Hew Zealand waters also made
apparent the need for long-range aircraft•Si Early in the
war the Dominion had asked Britain for eighteen modern air
craft if the situation with Japan became worse; in Hay the
United Kingdom agreed that eighteen aircraft would be re
fto
leased from her orders in the United States*
These planes
apparently did not come * for on November 2d* Prime Minister
Fraser informed Britain that a German raider had attacked
another New Zealand ship*

Only two planes could travel the

distance to defend her and these, occupied elsewhere, were
eight hours late in arriving*

Even if the planes arrived in

time, Fraser stated, they had no effective weapons to des
troy the attacker*

He pleaded with the British Government

to send aircraft of any type to remedy this helpless situaQo

tion*

Ail

After receiving a refusal,

Fraser sent another

telegram reminding Churchill that New Zealand had voluntarily
released bomber orders at the start of the war to help in
the defense of the mother c o u n t r y * N e w Zealand, conveyed
8l
Ross, Air Force, p* 69* New Zealand apparently did
not have any aircraft with a range of over four hundred miles*

®2Ibid., pp* 68-69* Britain had promised fifty
modern training craft, but due to the shortage in airplanes,
they did not arrive*
3GGNZ to SSDA, D o c u m e n t 1 8 9 , November 2 8 , 1940, in
Documents, XXX, 213*
84
SSDA to GGNZ, Document 190, December 2, 1940, Ibid*,
214*
**5GGNZ to SSDA, Document 191* December 4, 1940, Ibid,
New Zealand had thirty Wellington bombers on order but can
celed the order so Britain could have them*

4l
the Prime Minister, would not be in such a helpless position
if the bombers had come*

A half dozen planes were all that

the Dominion would want-— enough to frighten off raiders*
These planes would even be available for the defense of
Singapore* 86

In a reply outlining the glowing exploits of

the Mew Zealand Expeditionary Force, Churchill told Fraser
that bombers could not be taken away from the defense of
Q*y

England*

The small Dominion had no where else to turn for

aircraft*

True, she had an agreement with the United States
88
to buy craft,
but Britain received priority* Mew Zealand
would have to suffer*
Without planes the defense of the Fiji Islands, 1,000
miles away, seemed an Unsurmountable task*

It was decided,

however, that these islands should be fortified as the first
line of defense for New Zealand*

Over 2,000 reinforcements

86Xbid.. p. 2X5.
SSDA to GGNZ, Document 192, December 14, 1940,
Ibid., p. 216.
88
U. S * , Statutes at Large, LIV, Part 2, 2263-2277.
Mutual agreement signed at Wellington January 30, and Febru
ary 2 8 , 1940, for the importation of civil aircraft into New
Zealand* This was only the first attempt to secure better
relations with the United States* In July, at the height of
the crisis, Fraser asked the British Government to relay a
message asking the American Government if they would be in
terested in exchanging diplomats* Due to other pressing
matters and the coolness of Britain toward this idea, it was
five months before the American Government was informed of
the message* Again there was a delay, but finally, on Janu
ary 23, 1941, the Wellington Government announced that a New
Zealand representative would be sent to America* On Febru
ary 14, 1941, Walter Nash, chosen for the post, presented
his credentials to Roosevelt* For details see Vasserman,
f,The United States and New Zealand,” pp. 267-272*

were sent,

Ao

but even when joined with the native troops,

the force seemed pitifully small*

Planes had been sent in

August, but they were merely four in number and then, were
only trainers. 90 Other defense equipment was in short sup
ply, so short, in fact, that three old guns were salvaged
from a Public Works storehouse and parts were confiscated
from a museum to make them work* 91
Government appeals for the people to join in the
defense of the country were met by an indifferent attitude*
There were few men who volunteered for the Home Guard; the
other organizations had even more trouble obtaining recruits*
Plans were formulated to dig trenches and shelters around
Wellington, but no one would volunteer to h e l p . ^

People

viewed the defense measures as a chance for men to play
soldiers and treated the organizations as such* 94 The atti
tude of the people in the closing months of 1940 was not
entirely their fault*

Replacements for the Expeditionary

Force were balloted in December and would be sent away to
89Minister of Defense to General Bernard Freyberg,
Commander, 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force, Document 38,
October 12, 1940, in Documents, II, 29*
90Ross, Air Force * pp. 70-72*
91Gille»pie, The Pacific, p. 23.
92
The Evening Post (Wellington), December 7, 1940, p.
12*

^^Ibid., December 6, 1940, p. 6*
^ I b i d * , November 11, 1940, p. 6*
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fight a distant war. 95 Fraser’s Christmas message spoke of
peace and victory* 96 The Minister of National Service,
Sample, stated that 200,000 men would be in the Home Guard
» 97 This would surely be enough men to defend
by early 1941•
a small country.

The Evening Post (Wellington) related the

glowing exploits of the British Royal Air Force in the bat*
tie for Britain, but said little of Japanese movements in
the Pacific*

Yet the signs were ominous*

Britain was in a very tenuous position*

She could

neither strongly oppose Japan diplomatically, nor could she
adequately help the Pacific Commonwealth should they be
attacked*

Japan was forced to move south in search of
materials to sustain her war economy* 98 New Zealand had
few trained men and, even more critical, few if any modern
weapons*

On December 29, 1940, Roosevelt announced plans

^ I b i d ., October 17* 1940, p* 4*
96 Thorn, Peter Fraser, p. 184*
07
The Evening Post (Wellington), December 21, 1940,
p* 10*
98
Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States
Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. Ill, The Rising Sun
in the Pacific» 1931«^April«-»i<9¥2 (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1948), p. 60. Hereafter cited as Morison, The
Rising Sun. The United States had cut Japanese supplies tre
mendously by enforcing several embargoes. On June 5, 1940,
strategic minerals, chemicals, as well as aircraft engines,
parts and other air equipment were stopped. Aviation fuel,
lubricants, and certain classes of iron and steel materials
were halted on July 26. A complete embargo of all steel
was enforced September 30, 1940.
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for a lend-lease program to the Allies. 99'

Fraser, expressing

his Joy, exclaimed "never in history . • . /has7 there been
a pronouncement by a nation not actually engaged in warfare
so sweeping, effective and helpful." 100

The Prime Minister

undoubtedly felt that this new American program would relieve
the critical weapon shortage*

Any effective lend~lease help,

however, was almost beyond sight while the clouds of a Far
Eastern war were moving dangerously close to New Zealand*
^Thorn, Peter Fraser. p. 185*

CHAPTER III
JAPAN MOVES SOOTH
Events early in the new year, 1941, persuaded Japan
to expand her area of conquest*

The United States embargo

of* goods stifled the economy of the "Rising Sun," attempting
to force her to submit to the will of the western power*

To

break this strangle hold, Japan turned hungrily toward her
1
rich, weak southwestern neighbors* With the help of Germany
she forced French Indo-China into agreements which eventu
ally gave her the needed military bases for the conquest of
the mineral rich Netherlands East Indies* 2
New Zealanders, informed, but only mildly concerned
about previous Japanese movements, now received daily waraings of the grave threat to their security*

In a speech on

February 14, 1941, Prime Minister Fraser warned that the tide
of war was nearing New Zealand *s shores 4 and, although he
did not specifically mention Japan, his strong implication
^Hull, Memoirs. II, 9 8 3 .
2Jones, Japan* s New Order, pp* 235*238*
^The Evening Post (Wellington), February 11, 1941,
p* 7j February 14, p * 6 5 February 25* p* 7\ February 2 7 * p*

8

*

4

Ibid.. February 14, 1941, p. 8.
45
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left no doubt In the minds of his countrymen*

That same

day an editorial in The Evening Post {Wellington) warned
of the menace of Japan*

Xt urged the New Zealand people to

become united and dedicate themselves entirely to the war
effort
Despite the na3?ve outlook of the people and strong

6 the Labour Govern

opposition of some members of Parliament,

ment continued to step up defense preparations— ‘turning first
to the Army*

The standing Army was increased by keeping all

men who had just finished their basic training on active
duty rather than allowing them to return home and train only
on weekends*

7

Greater expansion was guaranteed by relaxing

regulations for age and physical fitness*

All single men

ages eighteen to forty-five were required to enroll for the
service* 8 Future Territorials would be drawn from these,
and instead of taking only those men in the best physical
condition, men who had previously been rejected for overseas
service because of minor disabilities were now ordered to

M

M

M

M

*

*

P

*

^

*

£
New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLXX (1941),
196* T* F* Doyle, member of the Legislative Council, stated
that Japan did not have the ability to expand the war be
cause of food, industrial and manpower shortages*
^The Evening Post (Wellington), March 3? 1941, p. 8 .
Previously, men returned home after training and waited for
orders to be called back into the service as they were needed*
Q
Ibid* * March 23 * 1941, p* 10* Exceptions to this
were Maoris, aliens and conscientious objectors*

join one of the civil defense branches*

9

It was decided

that married men ages eighteen to forty-five should register
for the service in May and would form a second division of
the General Reserve* 10

As Japanese intentions became

clearer in May, the Government decided that eighteen-yearolds would be called up to serve with the Territorials or
the Home Guard* 11 Married men without children, though now
enrolled, would not be conscripted until the end of the year*
The Home Guard was also in the process of being re
organized*

Because of the diversity of age between the men

in the organization, training geared to the ages of the men
was instituted* 13 The Government was also formulating plans
to have all personnel in the Guard drafted, as were the men
in the regular Array* 14 The biggest problem concerning the
9

Ibid* * p* 11* Grades of men taken were 1, la and 2,
out of a possible five grades*
10 Ibid*, p • 10* All single men formed the first di
vision of the General Reserve* Men with three children were
at this time exempted from the service*
11

Ibid*, May 22, 1941, p* 11* As soon as men reached
the age of nineteen they were usually sent overseas*
^ I b i d *, June 15• 1941, p • 8 * Instead of placing men
with three or more children on the deferred list, men were
now graded according to the number of children they had*
Conceivably then, no physically fit man was exempt from the
service*
1 3 Ibid.. March 2 6 , 1941, p. 7.

14
Ibid*, May 1, 1941, p* 11* The Home Guard was a
volunteer organization except for men who were unfit for the
overseas force and the Territorials* These men were ordered
to join the Guard* Most of the members, however, were
veterans of World War X and older men*
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Home Guard was not enticing the men to join, but acquiring
enough weapons to arm them.15

A member of Parliament

branded them a "broomstick force*H

He stated that although

the enrollment figure had reached 100,000, only older men
attended the evening and veekead drills because younger men
had grown weary of the game of* marching when there were few
rifles and no other means of defending themselves if the
enemy did come* l8 To alleviate this problem, Fraser, as
early as February, appealed to the people owning British
*303 rifles to give them to the Army* 17 The Government, due
to the poor response, later ordered all people owning such
rifles to give them to the Army at once* l8 Even with these
conscripted weapons, the Home Guard was still poorly armed*
The Emergency Precautions Scheme was next to come
tinder the scrutiny of the Government*

This organization was

expanded to include an Emergency Fire Service*

Men, unfit

for military service, were asked to volunteer and train to
help the regular fire department in all emergencies* 19
15Ibid.. April 21, 1941, p. 9.
at this time, estimated at 98,500*

The Home Guard was,

16

New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLIX (1941),
Sir Aplrana Ngata, Member of Parliament, was speak
ing* He was not exaggerating* In one detachment of eighty
troops there were only seven rifles* See The Evening Post
(Wellington), April 1, 1941, p* 10*
2 9 5 -2 9 6 •

*^Tfao Evening Post (Wellington), February 20, 1941,
p* 11.
1A

Ibid.. May 3, 1941, p. 8.

19lbid.. April 4, 1941, p. 5-

k9
Lighting restrictions were other measures taken to
protect the people and the country*

Xn February, Fraser

announced that New Zealand, modeling themselves after Great
Britain, would install air raid sirens, and restrictions on
house and automobile lights would soon be forthcoming* 20
Mild lighting restrictions were soon announced and were
gradually increased until coastal cities had a bare minimum
of lighting at night* 21

Shaded head lights were mandatory

for all automobiles and even harsher vehicle lighting restrictions were enforced in coastal cities* 22
The international situation created maximum efforts
in war manufacture*

British war material supply to New

Zealand was severely limited, forcing New Zealand to launch
several new enterprises in an effort to better equip her
Army*

Tanks were her first concern*

To remedy an almost

complete lack of this war machine, caterpillar tractors
were armoured and machine guns mounted on them*

This make

shift tank was quite crude and clumsy because of its heavy
weight and slow speed, but this handicap was counteracted by
20Ibid*, February 21, 19^1, p* 8.
21

Ibid*, May 21, 19^1, p* 10* There were few street
lights and all shop windows had to be shaded and could use
a maximum of one sixty-watt bulb* Porch lights on resident
houses were not allowed.
*"2Ibid*, June 10, 19^1, p. 10; June 28, 19^1, p*
10*
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providing huge transport trucks to carry them rapidly to
23
any part of the country.
Mobility lor protection of New Zealand4s long coast*
line was Increased by the manufacture of carriages lor both
light and heavy guns.

Hie heavy gun carriages, made Irom

truck parts and mounted on truck tires, were capable ol
moving thirty-live miles per hour on roads and twelve miles
per hour overland.

gL

l

Machine gun carriers, known as Bren

Carriers, were tracked vehicles manulactured Irom British
Imported parts. 25
Some munitions lor the armed lorces were also made
In New Zealand,

Concentrated ellorts were made to manufac

ture small arms ammunition, but the grenade was the Dominion*s
most important war product. 26

Many factors, however, ham

pered this phase ol defense, making It Impossible lor New
Zealand to reach high productive levels.

Raw materials,

machine tools, and technical ability were either non-existent
or were in such limited supply that output was always quite
small.27
2^Ibid., March 31, 1941, p. 8. The tank weighed
twenty-five tons and moved at a top speed of six miles per
hour. The New Zealand Army seldom had enough vehicles, so
whenever carriers of any kind were needed they were usually
impressed from the people. See Ibid., March 10, 1941, P* 9
or July 1$, 1941, p ♦ 8.
2^Ibid., April 4, 1941, p. 8.

These were made for

6 0 -pounders or 6-inch howitzers.

2^Ibid., February 4, 1941, p. 5«
26lbid.

27Ibid., March 4, 1941, p. 8
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By mid-year, defenses Had been greatly strengthened
In comparison to the past year*

When her defenses were com

pared with the sophisticated weapons of the major warring
powers, however, the small Dominion was almost naked* 28

Her

Air Force was small and consisted almost entirely of obsolete
29

planes; 7 the Navy was composed largely of small craft, and
the 145,000 man home defense force was only partially trained
and meagerly equipped* 30 Acutely aware of her defenseless
position if Japan became an enemy, New Zealand refused to
become Just another small island in British and American
Pacific war strategical plans*

She demanded a voice and par

ticipated in many of the conferences that dealt with the
Aslan problem*
New Zealand, in January and February, sent represen
tatives to Washington to participate in what was later known
as the ABC-1 Staff Agreements*

The conference was primarily

concerned with the war in Europe, but some resolutions con
cerning the Far East were discussed*

It was agreed that the

United States would increase its fleet in the Atlantic to
2^Gillespi©, The Pacific* p* 4* In June, 1941,
coastal defenses consisted of two 6-inch and two 4-inch guns*
2^H o s 8| Air Force * p* 77•
^ T h e Evening Post (Wellington), Hay 23, 1941, p. 8*
Territorial strength at this time was 45,000* With one hun
dred thousand Home Guardsmen, this would appear to be an
adequate force* The Territorials, however, were continually
drained to go overseas, and even they, due to a lack of
weapons, were usually only partially trained*
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allow the British to move a part of their fleet to Singapore*
In addition, the American Pacific fleet would extend its
patrols further south to protect British Islands in the
South Pacific* 31 Too small to have a commanding voice in
these proceedings, New Zealand agreed with the resolutions
but added that she hoped

• • every possible step would be

tahen to expedite the arrival of the main fleet at
32
Singapore » • *M
Singapore, the hub of British Far Eastern defenses,
was the scene of another conference in April* 33 Proposals
were exchanged

on the deployment of combined naval forces

in the Indian and Pacific Oceans*

Discussions also centered

on Luzon in the Northern Philippines and other probable
bases of attach against Japan*

It was suggested that if

Luzon fell the United States fleet would withdraw to
Singapore; however, no political commitments to this effect
were reached* 34 For the Americans this conference was a
great disappointment because the countries involved, namely
New Zealand, Australia and the Netherlands Indies, were pri
marily concerned with local waters, whereas the United States
31Herbert Feis, The Hoad to Pearl Harbor t The Coming
of the War between the United States and Japan (Princetons
Princeton University Press, 1946), p p * I6 9 -1 S B . Hereafter
cited as Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor♦
^2Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Docu
ment 24, May 21, 1941, in Documents, III, 34.
^Gillespie, The Pacific» p. 14.
34Ibid
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wanted a broad strategical plan for the whole a r e a . ^
Though little was accomplished, problems and proposals con
cerning the ever-increasing Japanese menace were aired*
These conferences were indicative of Japanese pres
sures being exerted*

The German Invasion of Russia on

June 22 forced Japan to make a decision*

She must either

support Germany by also invading Russia, or move south*

On

July 2, chief Japanese military and civil figures came together and plans were officially made to move south* 36
French Xndo-China was singled out as the first goal and was
to be occupied as soon as possible*

On July 14, Japan presented her demands to the Vichy Government. 37
' After several

days of impatient waiting the French Government was told
that unless an answer to the Japanese ultimatum was received
immediately, Japanese troops would invade the entire country*
On July 24, the French yielded! the same day 40,000 Japanese
38
troops moved into southern Xndo-China*
The American and British governments were completely
aware of what was occurring because the Japanese code had
^Horison, The Rising Sun, pp* 54-55* For more de
tail of the conference see Maurice Matloff and Edwin M* Snell,
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942« in
UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR XI (Washington: Office of
Chief of Military History, Department of Army, 1953)* p p •
6 5 -6 7 * Hereafter cited as Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planni»iig #

36

Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor * p* 215*

37 Ibid*

Also see Jones, Japan1a New Order, pp. 260-

261*
38 Jones, Japan1s New Order, p* 2 6 2 *
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been broken.

39

On July 5,

4o

41
and again on July 1 5 1
Fraser

was Informed of Japanese probable Intentions*

When the oc

cupation of Xndo-China did occur, voluminous correspondence
passed between Britain and her Dominions on possible ways to
retaliate for such seemingly open aggression*
The British Government offered two retaliatory
measures to be decided upon In conjunction with her Dominions*
The first resolution called for restrictions on Japanese
shipping facilities In Malaya; the other contemplated denouncIng the long-standing commercial treaty*

l±2

The New Zealand

Government replied that they agreed with the proposal to
abrogate the treaty and would do so as soon as word was recelved that the mother country gave her consent*

43

The small

Dominion, however, would have preferred a somewhat stronger
stand*

She suggested a Joint declaration be made by the

Netherlands East Indies, Britain, the United States, and the
Pacific Dominions stating any future move south, affecting
39 Xbld.. p. 263.

4n

SSDA
ment 2 5 , July
Fraser was In
4i
SSDA
ment 2 8 , July
4o
SSDA
ment 26, July
was signed In
43

to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu
5♦ 19^1, In Documents, III, 35*
Prime Minister
London at this time*
to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu
15» 19^1» Ibid*, p* 3 8 *
to Acting Prime
9« 19^1 3 Ibid*,
1911*

Minister of New Zealand, Docu
p* 3 6 * The commercial treaty

Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Docu
ment 29, July 16, 19^1 1 Ibid*, p. 39*
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the security of* the above countries, might be regarded as
an attack upon ail*

If* the United States would not Join,

New Zealand Celt that such a proposal should be made anyway,
thus making it clear to Japan the exact position of the
44
other countries*
The joint declaration was not forth
coming, but the Commercial Agreement was abrogated July 25
in Britain and July 27 in New Zealand.45
The United States decided that, as a retaliatory
measure, Japanese assets would be frozen*

Britain immedi

ately contemplated doing the same and Informed the Dominions
47

of her intentions* '

The New Zealand Government replied

that while they were aware of the tense situation which
greater economic sanctions might cause, it was felt that
close cooperation with the United States was necessary in
every endeavor to deter Japan* 48 After further consideration,
Britain, New Zealand, and the Dutch also froze Japanese assets* 4 9
44
Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Docu
ment 31, July 16, 1941, Ibid. ,p. 40.
45
SSDA to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu
ment 41, July 25, 1941, Ibid*,p. 50*
Acting PrimeMinister
to SSDA, Document 43, July 27, 1941, Ibid*, p* 50*
^^Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, p* 65*
47
SSDA to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu
ment 35, July 22, 1941, in Documents, III, 44*
43
Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand to R t • Hon* P.
Fraser (London), Document 37, July 24, 1941, Ibid*, p* 47*
^M a t l o f f and Snell, Strategic Planning, p* 65* Also
see The Evening Post (Wellington), July 2&, 1941, pp. 8 and
9*
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The new economic restrictions seriously affected the
Japanese economy*

By a single blow, three-quarters of her

foreign trade was severed*

Reserves of oil, essential in

fighting a war, were estimated to last between eighteen
months and two years* 50 Japan had two alternatives. She
must either slowly withdraw her forces from China and ac
cept defeat or take what she needed*

She chose force*

Britain had Just made the decision to impose economic
restrictions when word was received that Japan intended to
occupy Thailand* 51 Prime Minister Churchill immediately
informed the Dominions that the British Ambassador in
Washington was instructed to ask the United States Government
to Join in a communique with the British Commonwealth warning
Japan that grave consequences would occur if the ’’Rising Sun”
took such action*

American concurrence to such a proposal,

Churchill added, might be difficult to get * ^ 2

The Mew

Zealand Government, preferring a wait-and-see policy with
Japan before deciding upon a course of action,5 3 replied
^°J• R* M* Butler, Grand Strategy. Vol* III, p t • 2 ,
Junea 1941— August ^ 1942 in History of the Second World W a r «
United Kingdom Military Series, edited by J. R* M. Butler
(London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1964), 246-247* Also
see Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, p* 252.
51 SSDA to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu
ment 44, August 1, 1941, in Documents, III, 51*
52
SSDA to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu
ment 45, August 1, 1941, Ibid*, p « 52 and 52n*
53 Ac ting Prime Minister of New Zealand to the Prime
Minister of Australia, Document 48, August 14, 1941, Ibid*,
p. 57* This telegram was repeated to the Secretary of State
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that 11• • * it would seem unwise to take such action unless
and until there is available a force sufficiently strong
enough to ensure successful resistence to Japan in the area
54

threatened.M

Britain still wanted to send a warning to

Japan, but the reluctance of the United States and an im*
provement

in the situation seemed to make it unnecessary.55

She was, however, prepared to give Thailand as much assist*
ance as the European and Far Eastern situation would allow. 56
New Zealand, until the attack on Pearl Harbor, was
daily informed by Britain of the negotiations and increasing
tension between the United States and Japan.

Continually

strong in her attitude toward Japan, the small Dominion
found the final Japanese proposal to the United States com*
pletely unacceptable.57 Knowing that this strong stand was
for Dominion Affairs and the Prime Ministers of Canada and
South Africa.
54Ibid., p. 5 6 .
55 SSDA to Acting Prime Minister of New Zealand, Docu
ment 54, September 2, 1941, Ibid., pp. 61*62.
56 SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document
64, November 17* 1941, Ibid., p. 70.
Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 70,
November 24, 1941, Ibid., p. 7 6 . Japan's final proposal to
the United States stated that Japan would withdraw from Indo*
China when peace was restored with China or when peace in
the Pacific was arranged. The United States would unfreeze
Japanese assets and also provide a specified quantity of oil
to Japan. In addition, the United States would refrain from
prejudicing efforts to restore peace between China and Japan.
For details see Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, p. 309 or SSDA to
Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document 6 9 , November 23, 1941,
131 Documents. Ill, 77.
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not backed by any force, New Zealand pleaded with Britain
for more help and hastened to improve her own meager defenses*
At the height of the Xndo-China and Thailand crisis,
Australia and New Zealand asked Britain about the defense of
Singapore*

Both countries felt that Singapore should be re50
inforced as soon as the European situation allowed.
Britain, aware that negotiations between the United States
and Japan were crumbling, informed the Dominions that despite
the demands of the European war, two new battleships, the HMS
Prince of Vales and the HMS Repulse would be sent to
M HM M i

W M M N M M pN M W

CO

Singapore• '
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Additional reinforcements came during the criti

cal month of November*

Troops were transported to Malaya,

the Americans sent planes on the new Lend-Lease bill, and the
British started gathering a Far Eastern fleet* 6 0
18
^ Prime Minister of Australia to SSDA, Document 47,
August 11, 1941, in Documents, III, 54-55 and Prime Minister
of New Zealand to Prime Mini &t er of Australia, Document 48,
August 14, 1941, Ibid., pp. 55-56*
^^Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to Prime Min
ister of New Zealand, Document 59* October 31, 1941, Ibid.,
p • 67* There were several reasons for the delay in sending
ships* One reason was that in August Japan reinforced her
Manchurian Army* This was interpreted to mean a Northern
rather than a Southern movement by the Japanese. Another rea
son was that all available ships were needed to carry supplies
for a Hew Middle East offensive* See J* M* A* Gwyer, Grand
Strategy, Vol. Ill, p t • 1, June, 1941— August, 1942, in His
tory of the Second World W a r , United Kingdom Series, edited
by J. R. M. Butler (London: H* M. Stationary Office, 1964),
2 8 0 - 2 8 1 * Hereafter cited as Gwyer, Grand Strategy, June,
194l--August, 1942* The ships arrived in Singapore December
2, 194i. See Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 6l6-6l9•
^°Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, p. 301* The Far Eastern
fleet, as proposed in the ABC-1 agreements called for two or
three aircraft carriers, six battleships and an adequate es
cort of destroyers and cruisers*
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While patiently waiting for Great Britain to reinforce
Singapore, the New Zealand Government was not idle*

General

Sir Guy Williams, British military expert called to New
Zealand to make recommendations for home defense, 6 l reported
that the Home Guard ought to be reorganized, and suggested
that the organization be closely tied to the Army*

62

On

August 1, formal announcement of a complete reorganization
was made*

Hen were now compelled to attend all parades and

were also divided into separate divisions*

The first divi

sion , composed of "prime men," would act as a fighting force;
the second division would be less physically fit and would
63
act as a reserve*
To enhance the training of both the
Home Guard and the Territorials, Brigadier General Edward
Puttick, a member of the Expeditionary Force, was recalled
to New Zealand to assume duties as Chief of General Staff*

54

The Territorial force also received another reorgani
zation*

With the exception of those conscripted in the past

few months, this force received three months initial training
and then only two weeks camp training, plus out-of-camp weekly
parades, per year*

General Williams recommended that all

troops receive two months, instead of two weeks, annual
6l

The Evening Post (Wellington), June 24, 1941, p* 8 *
Ibid., July 21, 1941, p. 8 .
Ibid., August 1, 1941, p. 6 .

6 4 Ibid., p. 8 .

Wood, Political and External Affairs, p. 213.
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training. 66

To carry out this program, about one-sixth or

the officers and other ranks were mobilized to provide a
cadre of specially-trained men to handle the yearly train
ing of* the Territorials, or the training of* new recruits,
should mobilization be ordered*

67

Weapons to supply this reorganized home defense force
were still almost impossible to find.

In a telegram to the

Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, the Prime Minister
stated that efforts were being made to bring defenses up to
the standards of the Expeditionary Force*

Such standards

were hard to reach, however, because fl* • • unlike other
Dominions, New Zealand is unable to manufacture essential
arms for its own use and is therefore entirely dependent on
overseas sources • • •"68 Fraser added that they needed
equipment and asked for weapons of all kinds including rifles,
bayonets, tanks, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, machine
guns, and all the ammunition for firing the above weapons* 6 9

66Ibid*
^ T h e Evening Post (Wellington), September 19, 1941,
p. 4* A cadre consisted of about 5*700 Territorials* It is
interesting to note that in the height of the summer Far
Eastern crisis, 2 3 * 8 2 5 men were drafted for the Expeditionary
Force and many of these were taken from the ranks of the
Territorials*
See Xbid*, August 5, 1941, p. 8*

68Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document
193* September 4, 1941, in Documents, XXX, 217*
69Ib±d.
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Britain, busily producing these essential items for her own
70
needs, could only send a few tanks*
The New Zealand Navy was In a like state o1 imp rep aredness.

As ol July 30, the fleet consisted ol two 7*000-ton

cruisers, the HMS Achilles and HMS Leander, one armed merchant
vessel, one government vessel, nine mine sweepers or auxil
iary sweepers and a host ol small patrol cralt*

Naval per

sonnel consisted ol 349 officers and 3*®34 ranks, serving at
home and overseas* 71 General Williams, in a report on
October 1, did not recommend an increase in this lorce, but
advised that some of New Zealand’s small harbors be mined
and closed and all approach areas to the main harbors be
mined* 72 An estimate ol the cost ol such preliminary pre
cautions was not presented to the Defense Minister until
November 27, and was not formally adopted until December
15, 1941 . 7 3
The Air Force, as ol July 30* consisted ol 30,000
men,

74 though many ol these were connected with the British
^°The Evening Post (Wellington), October 20, 1941,

P* 5*
^ I b i d * i July 30, 1941, p* 9* The Navy had not been
greatly enlarged since September, 1939* See Waters, The
Navy, p. 14*
7 2 Waters, The Navy, p. 223-

7 3Ibid*, pp* 224 and 225*
El,000,000*

The estimated cost was

^ T h e Evening lost (Wellington), July 30, 1941, p*
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air arm*

Due to the shortage of* equipment, little improve*
ment had been made since early 1941• 75 New Zealanders now
boasted of an aircraft factory, but this Industry employed
a mere 2 2 5 men and did not make engines or instruments* 76
These necessary items had to be imported and were almost im
possible to get*
The Fiji Islands, supposedly New Zealand's first line
of defense were, as of November, defended by 4,943 men*
Weapons included six 18 -pound artillery guns, twelve dilapidated aircraft, one old ship, and five patrol launches* 77
When Japan ordered the mobilization of their Southern
. 78
Army on November 6 ,
“there was not one anti-aircraft gun
in the South West Pacific * * * and the strength of defenses
would not have deterred the most irresolute enemy*M79
75 Ross, Air Force, p* 77* During the late months of
1941, New Zealand did receive some Hudson bombers from
United Kingdom allocations in the United States* Modern air
craft , however, was still very scarce in New Zealand*
^ T h e Evening Post (Wellington), August 21, 1941, p *
10*

^Gillespie, The Pacific, p* 42*
7 Ibid., p. 12.

7 9 Ibid., p. 42.

CHAPTER IV
THE THREAT OF INVASION
On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor*
The Government of New Zealand had received warnings of
Japanese movements the previous day,**- but, as In the United
States, the attack came as a surprise*

The Government
quickly reacted by declaring war on Japan 2 and then turned

to the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff for estimates of the
country's defense needs to withstand the probable invasion*
On December 8, the military generals issued a report
stating that six months would elapse before an invasion
force would threaten the country, and only then if the
/

United States suffered another major defeat and the 11fortress" at Singapore fell*
^SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Documents
90-98, December 7, 1941, in Documents* III, 97-104* New
Zealand received a detailed account of the proceedings be
tween Japan and the United States from the last days of
November until the attack*
2
The Evening Post (Wellington), December 9« 1941,
p* 8* New Zealand declared war on Japan at 11 A* M* ,
December 8, 1941*
3
"wood, Political and External Affairs, p* 214* The
Chiefs also recommended that, if adequate naval protection
could be found, the reinforcements for the Expeditionary
Force should be sent* They stated New Zealand need only
to mobilise the 4,600 fortress troops*
63
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Within a few days, two hug* new battleships, the HMS
Prince of* Wales and the HMS Repulse, sent by Prime Minister
Churchill to protect Singapore, had been sunk* 4 This tragedy
prompted Prime Minister Fraser, on December 11, to speak to
the Hew Zealand House or Representatives concerning the
country's position*

He declared that the loss of the two

battleships as well as the recent Japanese attacks on Malaya,
Hong Kong, and other United States and United Kingdom possessions had placed New Zealand in extreme danger* 5 The
Prime Minister added that the War Cabinet was closely watch
ing the situation and said that the necessary steps were
being taken to defend the country.

Fraser revealed that the

entire Air Force, plus units of the Home Guard and Terri
torials, had already been called to duty*

In addition, entry

or new recruits into service had been moved up irom January
to December 15* and all leave had been canceled tor members
oi the Armed Services— exceptions being made tor those re
placements destined for immediate service in the Expeditionary
Force* 6

In matters or civil derense ot the population, the

ij.
The Evening Post (Wellington), December 11, 1941, p*
9* These two battle ships, arriving at Singapore on Decem
ber 6 , were supposed to have been accompanied by an aircrart
carrier, but an unfortunate accident sent the carrier to
port tor repairs* Without air protection, the Japanese
quickly sank both ships* For details ot the sinking see
J* M* A* Gwyer, Grand Strategy. June, 1941— August, 1942,
pp. 308-310.
^New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLXX (1942), 24*
Ibid.
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Emergency Precautions group had been placed on constant
alert*

To impress upon the people the gravity oF the situa

tion, Fraser exclaimed, "It is the plain duty of* every man
and woman to Join up with the appropriate organization and
to prepare themselves to do their part when the country may
be Fighting For its very existence and when the lives oF
every man, woman, and child may be in danger•"7
The Prime Minister's estimate oF his country's dan*
gerous position was not exaggerated*

Preoccupation with the

war in Europe and the diFFiculty oF obtaining material had
leFt the New Zealand defense Force tragically inadequate.
Her Air Force consisted oF thirty-six bombers and twenty-nine
other First-line aircraFt•

She had some 251 other craft» but

these were either obsolete or were trainers and could be
8
used only in case oF extreme emergency*
The Navy had not
be en measurably expanded since July, 1941* 9 The Army had
13,250 men in camp (including reinForcements For the 2nd di
vision and the Fiji Islands), 4,600 Fortress troops, and
other small training cadres, all exclusive oF the Home Guard*
7 Ibid.. p. 25.

8Gillespie, The PaclFic, pp* 43-44.

The Air Force con
tained 10,500 personnel, but 2,512 had been sent to Canada
to train For action over Europe* A plan called the FAFAI
Scheme, was also organized, whereby, in emergency, every
available plane and
every available pilot would be employed
as bombers— regardless IF the plane was a Fighter, trainer,
or civilian craft#
For details see Ross, Air Force* p* 111*
9See Chapter XXX, p. 61.
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On December 15, 11,000 Territorial recruits entered camp;
by the end of December, 2 8 , 8 5 0 men were in camp, and the
Army was preparing facilities for a total of 39,350 troops
10
by January 10*
The poorly-trained and meagerly-equipped
Home Guard was issued fifty none-too-new machine guns but
was not given further training* 11
The Fiji Islands, New Zealand*s first line of defense
and an important air reinforcing chain for the United States,
was heavily reinforced with all existing anti-aircraft and
Bofor guns, as well as eighteen field guns, two 6 -inch
howitzers and two 6 0 -pound field guns*

Manpower was also

increased by over 4,000 men* 12
Throughout the remainder of December, the Government
continued to place the country on an emergency war footing*
All men between ages twenty-one and fifty-five, with as many
as three dependent children, were asked to enroll in some
defense organization* 13 People living in cities were ordered
^ G i l l e s p i e , The Pacific, pp. 43-44. The Territorials,
numbering 31,000, were not mobilized at this time* See also
Wood, Political and External Affairs, pp. 212-213*

12Chief of General Staff (Wellington) to General
Freyberg, Document 53* January 2, 1942, in Documents, II, 3 6 .
Prime Minister of New Zealand to Rt • Hon* W ins ton Chur chill
(Washington), Document 257, Ibid*, III, 294-295* Fraser did
not tell Churchill that the only four anti-aircraft and the
only four Bofor guns possessed by New Zealand were sent to
the Fiji Islands and were taken from coastal emplacements*
These guns were replaced with dummies until more guns arrived
from Britain* See Gillespie, The Pacific, p* 46*
* ^The Evening Post (Wellington), December 19* 1941,
p* 6*
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to make provision for entire blackouts in home and factory 3.4
and, although the cities were not fully darkened, many full
blackout practices occurred during December* 15 Men were also
asked to help dig trenches around the cities to act as bomb
shelters or defense positions but, despite several pleas,
few people responded*^
The situation for New Zealand looked falsely optimis
tic by the end of December* American troops and equipment
were arriving in Australia 17 and, after urgent appeals to
the United Kingdom and the United States, military supplies
consisting mainly of small arms and ammunition, but Including
some big guns, began arriving in New Zealand*

The anti

quated Air Force also received word that it would get planes
and did, in fact, receive thirty Hudson bombers by the end
19
of December*
These events prompted Lieutenant General Sir
Edward Puttick, Commander of the forces in New Zealand, to
announce that things were looking good in the Pacific but, he
added, "* • • the crisis is not over*" 20
Ibid.
lgIbid.. December 15, 19^1, p. 6.
1g
x Ibid., December 18, 1941, p* 8.
^ M a t l o f f and Snell, Strategic Planning, pp. 8 3 , 8 5 *
On December 12, 1941, a convoy of American troops and planes
were diverted from Manila to Australia* On December 15, two
more ships were ordered to load with munitions and planes
for Australia*
“^Gille s p i e , The Pacific, p* 44*
19
7Hoas, Air Force, p. 77*
2^The Evening Post (Wellington), December 21, 1941, p.
4.
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Indeed, the real crisis had only begun*

By the end

of December the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Issued another
report— more serious and threatening than the last*

The

revised estimate of probable invasion stated that if the
American fleet suffered another serious defeat, an attack
could come within three months*

To defend the country at

least six divisions would be needed, and currently, only
three divisions had been formed*

They recommended that the

reinforcements scheduled to go to the Middle East in Janu
ary should remain and that no reinforcements be sent to the
European theater until December, 19%2*
The Prime Minister immediately cabled General Bernard
Freyberg, Commander of the Second New Zealand Expeditionary
Force, that the situation with Japan and the possible threat
to the Fiji Islands necessitated diverting some, or all,
re infore ement s away from the Near East*

Fraser added that

the Government had no intentions of forgetting New Zealand’s
commitments to that theater, but circumstances in the South
Pacific made retention of these troops necessary* 22

On

December 30, the Prime Minister announced that a complete
21
22

Gordon, New Zealand Becomes sl Pacific Power, p* 175*

Prime Minister to General Freyberg, Document 52,
December 26, 19^1, in Documents, II, 3 6 * In a reply,
Freyberg revealed t h a t h i s command had enough reinforcements
to last six months or, with luck, until August, 19^2, after
which he hoped that more men would arrive*
See General
Freyberg to Prime Minister, Document 5^* January 5* 19^2,
Ibid*, pp. 38-39.
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mobilization of the Territorials and Expeditionary Force
reinforcements would take place January 10* 2 3
Several days after Fraser's announcement the United
States informed the New Zealand Government that an attack
on the Fiji Islands could take place at any time*

The scale

of attack was estimated to be one division with four aircraft carriers as an escort. 24 Since mobilization was only
a few days removed, New Zealand decided to wait.

On January

10 the Dominion mobilized:
. . . twenty-three battalions and eighteen being
formed, nine mounted rifle regiments, and miscellane
ous and^ancil 1 ary troops. Medium guns and howitzers
. . . /were/ . . . utilised to cover various anchor
ages, leaving only one troop of 6 -inch howitzers for
the field forces. Field artillery . . . ^/included7
thirty-six 25-pounders and fifty 18-pounders. The
total strength . . . /wajs7 approximately 5 0 , 0 0 0 by
10 January, rising to 62,000 about one month later,
and 68*000 ultimately, all exclusive of the Home
Guard.
On the day of mobilization, New Zealand Chiefs of
Staff issued yet another report on defense in relation to
2^The Evening Post (Wellington), December 30, 1941,
p . 6.
Gillespie, the Pacific, p. 2 6 . This was not an
idle warning. According to Churchill, Japan planned to
take the Fiji Islands and other islands to obtain jumping
off points in invasions of New Zealand, Australia and Hawaii.
See Winston S. Churchill, The Second World W a r . Vol. IV:
The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1950),
p. 239* Hereafter cited as Churchill, Hinge of Fate.
2^The Chief of General Staff (Wellington) to General
Freyberg GOC 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force (Egypt),
Document 194, January 2, 1942, in Documents, III, 217-218.
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the resources of its Far Eastern neighbors*

This analysis

stated that Japan needed resources such as rice, tin, rubber,
oil, etc., and these items were not found in New Zealand*
Thus it would neither be necessary to attack New Zealand
nor, in the estimation of the Generals, would the country
be attacked until either Allied naval power was destroyed or
Allied power to reinforce the Far East failed* 26
opinion, Japan had four possible objectives*

In their

The first was

to secure China by cutting off supplies; the second was to
eliminate the Allied naval force by neutralizing Singapore
and Manila; the third was acquiring resources in the South
Sea; and the fourth was keeping the Allies from interrupting
pursuit of the other three objectives* 27 The last objective
presented the danger to New Zealand*

Japan would, according

to the Chiefs of Staff, seize strategic islands to secure
and consolidate her possessions*

The Fiji Islands would be

among those attacked, therefore, New Zealand should do
everything possible to fortify them*

In conclusion, the

Generals felt that New Zealand and surrounding islands would
have to fear only small raiding parties until Japan had secured her gains and could launch a major invasion force* 28
Although this report was more encouraging than those
in the past, frenzied preparations for air attack or invasion
28

Gordon, New Zealand Becomes ja Pacific Power, p* 148•

27Ibld.. p. 149oft

I b i d * • PP* 150-151.
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continued*

Authorization was given to local governments

and to the Emergency Precautions Scheme to confiscate
buildings and lands for use as air raid shelters*

oq

The

general public was also warned to have buckets of water
ready at all times for fires caused by incendiary bombs.
Due to gaps in the EPS ranks caused by recent ballots for
the service, the organization was made compulsory for all
men between the ages of eighteen and sixty-six who did not
or could not belong to the Armed Services* 31
Workers in New Zealand were also required to regis
ter with the Government*

The reasons given for this were

11• • • to direct them into work of national importance, to
stop workers from leaving industries which were regarded as
essential, and to restrict the engagement of labourers into
industries not regarded as essential•1132
Men for the Army continued to be balloted at a rapid
pace throughout January*

All eligible single men had been

drafted by late December, 1941, thus forcing the Government,
on January 20, to ballot 27*104 3 3 married men between the
ages of eighteen and forty-five who were without children* 34
The Evening Post (Wellington), January 6, 1942, p*
8; January 8, 1942, P~* ST
^^Ibid*, January 21, 1942, p. 6*
^^Ibid*, January 22, 1942, p* 8.
32Baker, The New Zealand People at W a r , p* 97*
^^The Evening Post (Wellington), January 21, 1942, p* 4.
^^Ibid*, January 6, 1942, p. 6.
Working Democracy, p. 115*

Also see Nash, A
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The Home Guard was taken out of civilian control and placed
under the Army, but was not mobilized. 35
The Air Force, though suffering from an acute short
age of

planes, was, nevertheless, in a continuous

expansion.

state of

In addition to several new airfields constructed

before the war, many more were now being planned and
equipped for operation by large, heavy-duty craft•36

Radar

stations were also being established in New Zealand, but
there was much work left to be done in this area* 37
It had, by this time, become uncomfortably obvious
that battles in this war could be won or lost by air support.
New Zealand, acutely aware of her nakedness in this area,
pleaded with the United Kingdom throughout January and the
first weeks in February for planes.

Fighter planes were

critically needed for the protection of any bomber force
that would strike at an invasion convoy. 38 Short-range in
terceptor craft were needed to protect Auckland and
Wellington, New Zealand's two main p o r t s .39
^ Prime Minister
^Nash,

Working Democracy, p. Il6•

Ibid.. pp . 1 X 4 - 1 1 5 .
37
Ross, Air Force, p. 115* Lack of fighter planes
made ground radar unnecessary. Most of what little equip
ment New Zealand had went into air radar to detect invaders.
When the Allies came, a different radar network had to be
installed.
38
Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document
195* January 30, 19^2, in Documents, III, 218.
39Ibid
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Fraseri in a telegram to Churchill, asked for only two
squadrons of long-range fighters and two squadrons of inter
ceptor fighters i the minimum amount needed for the protec40
tlon of the country*
Prime Minister Churchill replied
that a telegram containing the proposed allocations of
defense equipment was already on its way to Mew Zealand* 4l
Before Churchill*s telegram was received, the outline of
defense equipment allocations arrived*

It stated that

thirty-six trainer fighter planes, which had been on order
42
since the end of December,
might be sent, as well as
3 Fraser immediately reminded
eighteen additional fighters* 4 J
Churchill that most of these aircraft had been on order for
some time and, although he was grateful, the planes would
still not be enough to adequately defend the small Dominion* 44
After some delay, Churchill wearily replied that he would
ask the United States to allocate two squadrons of fighters
40

Ibid* Fraser specifically asked for eighteen
fighters to act as bomber escorts and twenty-seven fighters
to act as interception aircraft*

41 SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document 196,
February 3, 1942, Ibid*, p* 219* In a telegram not published,
Britain outlined material, primarily rifles, tank artillery
and planes she would agree to send New Zealand by March 31,
1942.
See Ibid*, 219n.
42
Ibid*, p* 220n* An unpublished telegram, dated
December 27, 1941 * requested planes for New Zealand defense*
43
Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 197*
February 4, 1942, Ibid*, p* 220* New Zealand was quite up
set over these additional eighteen planes because at the
same time 124 planes were going to Australia*
44
Ibid•, p* 221*

7%
to New Zealand and, if the Americans could not comply, he
would divert two United States squadrons destined for North
Ireland to New Zealand* 45 The prospect of increased fighter
protection coupled with the arrival of an American squadron
in the Fiji Islands, 46 made the plane situation, by the mid
dle of February, look somewhat brighter for the frightened
little country*
New Zealand9s immediate defense interests were closely
tied to the broader Allied strategical plans for the prose
cution of the Pacific war*

The Dominion was vitally Interested

in these plans and meant to have a voice in determining Far
Eastern war strategy*

Within a month after the attack on

Pearl Harbor, a unified command of the countries affected by
the Pacific war was created*

Known as the ABDA Command and

named after the four principle powers in the area, the Com
mand encompassed the countries of Australia, the Netherlands
East Indies, Burma, the Philippines, the South China Sea,
the northeast part of the Indian Ocean, and all British and
American possessions in this area* 47 Sir Archibald WavalX
was placed in command of the entire area and had subordinate
^ S S D A to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document 196,
February 14, 19^2, Ibid*, p* 222* On April 9* New Zealand
was informed that these squadrons would not come*
46 Ross, Air Force, p. 174* An American fighter squad
ron arrived in the Fiji Islands by the end of January* They
were followed, a few days later, by several flying fortresses*
Also see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, p. 171*
47
Morison, The Rising Sun, p • 277•
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officers from each of the countries concerned* 43

New

Zealand was not to be connected with this area but was to be
part of another section called Australasia, which encom
passed American shipping lines to the Pacific and was to be
protected by the Americans* 49
Fraser, in a rather bitter telegram to Churchill,
emphatically declared he did not agree with this arrange*
raent•50 The ABDA area was much too small, New Zealand was
definitely tied to this area and wanted a full voice in the
proceedings of the Command* 51 The Prime Minister, referring
to New Zealand’s isolation caused by the ABDA Command, de
clared that the country had always abided by past decisions
made by the British Government because each decision eould
mean the life of the United Kingdom, but now, with the war
at New Zealand’s doorstep, it was vitally necessary for the
Dominion to have a part in the decisions made by the higher
authorities— whether in London or Washington*

50

Japanese gains in the South Pacific and the incessant
demands of New Zealand resulted in the organization of a
48 SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document
112, December 29, 1941, in Documents* III, 113-114.
Ibid.. p. 114.
50Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document
117, January 17, 1942, Ibid* * p. 124.
51Ibid.. p. 1 2 5 .
52lbid.. p. 1 2 8 .
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naval command known as Anzac. 53^

This area encompassed part

of Australia« British New Guinea« the Solomons, the Fiji
Islands, and New Zealand with Vic© Admiral H. F. Leary, USN,
as Commander in Chief*. 54 Soon after the formation of this
new area was announced, Fraser received another telegram
stating that plans were being formulated for a council com
posed of Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands.

This war council would be closely connected

with the United States and would have a voice in the direc
tion of the Pacific V a r # ^

New Zealand replied that the

United States should definitely have a seat on this policymaking body^56 and that a council in London with communications
in Washington would be much too clumsy, 57 therefore, the
^^Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to Prime
Minister of New Zealand, Document 119* January 14, 1942,
Ibid., p. 124.
54 Morison, The Rising Sun, pp. 277-278.

^^SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document 121,
January 17* 1942, in Documents, III, 133* See also Document
123* January 19* 1942, Ibid., pp. 134-135* Churchill, Hinge
of Fate, p. 18.
56 Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 124,
January 20, 1942* in Documents, III, 125*
*57

'Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 129,
January 26, 1942, Ibid., p. 142. The combined BritishAxnerlcan Chiefs of Staff were located at Washington. Mes
sages would have to be transmitted between New Zealand, the
Council in London, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington,
back to the Council and then back to the President of the
United States for confirmation.
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organization should probably be in Washington* 58

This

realistic proposal was forwarded through London to Washington
whereupon Roosevelt, agreeing with Churchill, stated that the
council should be held in London* 59 Such formidable opposi
tion quieted all dissenting opinion, thus making it possible
for the council to meet February 10* 6o

New Zealand received

her voice in the conduct of the Pacific war but, somewhat
disgruntled with the situation, continued to fight for the
6l
organization of a Washington war council*
Areas of command for the prosecution of the war had
no sooner been organized when events forced complete altera
tion*

Xn December the Japanese landed on Malaya and steady

fighting had finally forced the defenders, by February 2,
to withdraw to Singapore island* 6 2

By February 12, most of

the "impregnable fortress" had to be blown up to prevent it
^Ibid., p. 143* Also see The Evening Post (Welling
ton), January 2 8 , 1942, p* 6 *
59 SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document
133* February 2 , 1942, Ibid., pp. 145-146.
^Churchill, Hinge of Fat®, p* 19* Also see Nicholas
Mansorgh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs; Problems
of War Time Cooperation and Post War Change, 1939-52
(London and others: Oxford University Press, 1 9 5 5 ) 7 P* 137*
Hereafter cited as Mansergh, Survey of Commonwe alth Affairs*
6l
See Documents 139 > 141, 143, and 145 In Documents.
Ill, 1 5 1 -1 5 2 , 154, 155, 1 5 6 .
^2
The Evening Post (Wellington), February 2, 1942,
p. 5.
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63
from Calling into Japanese hands• ^

Four days later
Churchill announced that Singapore had fallen. 6% Fraser,
In an announcement th© same day, stated, ,fIt would be Idle
and wrong to pretend that the fall of Singapore has not
brought danger nearer to our shores.

But while there Is

ample cause for well-grounded concern, there Is no room for
foolish or frantic panic*"65
The danger to New Zealand was certainly great enough
to cause panic.

The FIJI Islands were now the only fortified

islands that lay between New Zealand and the Japanese Navy,
and they had received possible attach warnings. 66 On
February 17* Fraser cabled Churchill an outline of possible
Japanese objectives. 67' They were:
(1) attack Burma, (2)
go through Burma to attack India, (3) attack Australia, and
(4) attack New Zealand. 68 Xt did not seem plausible that
Japan would venture an attack on India, but she might try
6 3m»id.. February 12, 1942, p. 7*
Ibid., February 16, 1942, p. 5« For events of the
fall of Singapore see Churchill, Hinge of Fate, pp. 92-107*
^ T h e Evening Post (Wellington), February 16, 1942,
p. 6.

66

Ross, Air Force, pp. 125-126. On February 13,
Coastwatchers had sighted a task force headed for the Fiji
Islands. Pilots were briefed for a possible attack, but the
Japanese apparently turned in another direction since they
were not seen the next day.
67

Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document
199, February 17, 1942, in Documents, III, 223-227*
6ft

Ibid., p. 225*
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to consolidate her gains by driving th© Allies out of the
69
Pacific, * To prevent this from occurring, the Prim® Minis
ter felt that both Mew Zealand and the Fiji Islands should
be heavily fortified* 70 Fraser estimated that minimum air
strength needed to protect his country, besides those planes
already possessed by Mew Zealand, would be two long-range and
two short-range fighter squadrons, on© dive bomber squadron,
four troop carrying planes, and two torpedo bomber or
medium bomber squadrons*'71 He also recommended that a host
of other equipment be sent, enough to turn the little
country into a fortress,'72
New Zealand Chiefs of Staff, unlike Fraser, found it
Increasingly difficult to give further estimates of an attack because of so many varying factors•73 Japanese strength
could only be estimated and the Japanese in turn would have
to evaluate New Zealand strength, its importance as an Allied
base, and the countryfs importance as a possible Japanese
base in an attack on Australia* 74 Only one factor remained
Ibid.

7°Ibid.. p. 226.

71 Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 200,
February 19, 1942, Ibid*, p* 231*
72Ibid., p. 229n.
7^Chief of General Staff (Wellington) to tbe New
Zealand Liaison Officer (London), Document 203, February 27,
1942, Ibid*, p. 231* Also see Gordon, New Zealand Becomes
a Pacific Power, p. 155*
^Document 203, in Documents, III, 231*

do
constant In the estimate or the Generals.

If Allied naval

fleets were to receive a major defeat, Invasion would seem
quite likely and might succeed because of partially*trained
men and Inferior weapons. 75
The lack of weapons and the difficulty In procuring
them spurred New Zealand to greater efforts In home defense
preparation*

The program of building air raid shelters was

76
accelerated,' plans were made for population dispersal In
cities In case of attack, 77 emergency medical facilities were
organized'78 and, above all, more men were called for the
service•79
Though the situation looked dark to many New Zealanders,
evidence of promised American and British aid was starting
to appeari

A small American naval force, on February 12,

arrived In New Z e a l a n d T h i s was followed several days
later by a letter from Roosevelt stating that Americans would
soon strongly reinforce both Pacific Dominions. 8l As Fraser
was reading this heartening note, 19,000 American soldiers
75
76

Ibid.t p. 232.
The Evening Post (Wellington), February 14, 1942,

p. 8.
^ I b i d ., February 11, 1942, p. 4*
^^Ibid., February
79 Ibid., February
called regardless of the
fin
Ibid*, February

9* 1942, p. 4*
6, 1942, p. 6. All young men were
number of children they had.
12, 1942, p. 8.

^^Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, p. 165*
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Ao
were slowly crossing th© Pacific to Australia* *' There
would, however, be several more dark clouds before relief
would come*
X
Th® continued southern progress of the Japanese8 *
and particularly the loss of Singapore, destroyed the ABDA
area*

By the end of February It was decided that the or*

ganization* s headquarters be dissolved and command be transferred to the Dutch, who were still fighting In some areas.
85
The attack on Darwin, Australia, in February
and the
invasion of New Guinea 86 made the threat of Invasion, for
the Pacific Dominions, seem dangerously close*

84

To substitute

for the rather protective shield of the ABDA Command,
Australia, with full agreement from New Zealand, proposed an
extension of the Anzac area to cover both countries and the
surrounding islands* 87 An Anzac Council In Washington com
posed of the United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and
Ibid.. p. 1 2 9 .
83
Gillespie, The Pacific, p* 18* By January 23, the
Japanese occupied Timor, the Celebes and a part of New
Guinea*
84 SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document
148, February 25, 1942, in Documents, III, 157*
85
The Evening Post (Wellington), February 20, 1942,
p. 5*
Q£
Ibid., March 9. 19^2, p. 5.
87
Prime Minister of Australia to SSDA, Document 151,
March 4, 1942, in Documents, III, 161*
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Australia, with President Roosevelt as Chairman, would direct
the new command.^
This proposal was sent to the United Kingdom and the
United States, but, in the meantime, the Americans had
offered a counter-proposal•

This plan stated that the United

Kingdom would protect and control the area west of Singapore,
including the Indian and Mediterranean Oceans; the United
States would assume responsibility for the area east of
Singapore, including Australia and New Zealand.

The President

also suggested a Washington Pacific War Council be organized
to deal with defense questions, leaving the London Council
89
to cope with the political disputes.
Several weeks after this new proposal was offered,
New Zealand, much to her dismay, learned that under the new
arrangement she would again be separated from Australia.
The area defended by the United States would be subdivided
into several commands.

The small Dominion would be opera

tional headquarters for an area covering the South Pacific
and including all small islands surrounding New Zealand. 90
Australia would be operational headquarters for an area
Including that country and all immediate approaches to it
AA

Ibid., p. 162.

89 High Commissioner for New Zealand (London) to the
Prime Minister, Document 151, March 4, 1942, Ibid., p. l6l.
^°New Zealand Minister (Washington) to the Prime
Minister, Document 1 6 7 , March 24, 1942, Ibid., p. 186•
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and would be designated as tbe South-West Pacific* 91

New

Zealand, definitely opposed to any separation of the two
Dominions and viewing such proposals as ”imprac tic al and
dangerous,1*92 could do little to change existing plans* She
therefore, on April 5, gave her reluctant consent to the
creation of the new Pacific commands* 93^
The disheartening news of separation from Australia
was lessened by the creation of a Washington Council*
Meeting on April 1, 19^2, the Council consisted of members
from the United Kingdom, China, Australia, the Netherlands,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States* 9% This was a
major accomplishment for the Pacific Dominions since they
would now, at least, be informed of decisions being made
which affected their areas*
The creation of a new South Pacific Command, with New
Zealand as its base, foretold the help that would soon come*
Churchill had already asked President Roosevelt to send
^ N e w Zealand Minister (Washington) to the Prime
Minister, Document 178, April 3, 19^2, K i d *, p* 199* Also
see Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, pp* 168-169*
^2Prim« Minister of New Zealand to the Prime Minister
of Australia, Document 171, March 26, 19^2, in Documents,
III, 190*
^ Prime Minister of New Zealand to the New Zealand
Minister, Washington, Document 179, April 5, 19^2, Ibid*,
p * 201•
^ M a t l o f f and Snell, Strategic Planning, p* 217n$ Nash,
A Working Democracy, p. 123* The Council was not the policy
making body that New Zealand and Australia had hoped, but
rather served to keep the Dominions Informed of the events
and plans for the Pacific War. See Mansergh, Survey of
Commonwealth Affairs, pp. 138-139*
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troops to New Zealand 95 and, Roosevelt replied that the
United States would send a division to New Zealand and a
division to Australia*

This, added to the two divisions

en route to the Pacific would make a total of 90,000
American troops in the area* 96 The division that was to
come to New Zealand would not, however, sail until Hay 15* 97
American troops, while appreciated, were, to the New
Zealand point of view, too few and too slow in coming. 98
Estimates placed Japanese available strength at twenty-nine
divisions, while New Zealand home strength was three divisions*99 The three divisions, coupled with the American
division, left the defense force two short of the estimated
six divisions needed to defend the country*’^* and pitifully
small in comparison to estimates of Japanese strength*
On March 27, a long-awaited report from the British
Chiefs of Staff on New Zealand defenses was received*

This

^Churchill, Hinge of Fate, p. 193 • Churchill wanted
an American division to go as an alternative to New Zealand
withdrawing her division from the Middle East*
96Ibid.. p. 195^ S S D A to Prime Minister of Mew Zealand, Document 208,
March 10, 1942, in Documents, 111, 235*
98
Prime Minister of New Zealand to SSDA, Document 210,
March 15» 1942, Ibid*, p* 243* It appears that New Zealand
fears might have been Justified* In February and March,
Japanese submarines launched reconnaissance planes and made
several flights over the Wellington and Auckland areas, as
well as the Fiji Islands* See Gillespie, The Pacific, p*
50 or Waters, The Navy, p* 214*
^Document 210, Documents, III, 245*
above p* 68
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report stated that an attack was highly unlikely 101 but 1f
it did come, the Japanese would have an estimated eleven
divisions and live aircraft carriers*

102

To combat this

force the Generals suggested th® Allied naval and ground
forces in the area be bolstered and that New Zealand be
supplied with guns for her poorly-armed army, anti-aircraft
and anti-tank weapons, but most of all—-airplanes* 103
Almost immediately after the report was received,
the British Air Ministry told the Dominion that no planes
104
were available at the present time*
This information
was followed the same day by a telegram from Churchill
stating that United States planes could not be diverted from
105
Australia for use in New Zealand*
He did add, however,
that some craft would be diverted from the Middle East consigament and would soon arrive in New Zealand*
lOl

New Zealand Liaison Officer (London) to Chief of
General Staff (Wellington), Document 219« March 27, 1942, in
Documents, 1X1, 253* The report stated that a Japanese in
vasion would entail long lines of communication— easily cut*
If islands surrounding New Zealand could be held an Invasion
did not seem likely* If these islands were taken. New
Zealand would be isolated* This would serve Japanese pur
poses, thus making invasion unnecessary*
102Ibld.
103Ibld., p. 254.
104
SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document
221, March 31, 1942, Ibid., pp. 2 5 7 - 2 5 8 .
SSDA to Prime Minister of New Zealand, Document
222, March 31, 1942, Ibid., p. 259.
106Ibid.
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The frustration felt by the Labour Government must
have been immense*

The small , frightened country, with no

bargaining power at her disposal, could only wait for
relief or invasion-— whichever came first*

One of the major

steps taken in preparing for invasion was the further
broadening of conscription powers*

Besides calling up an

additional 17,500 men for the Territorial f o r c e s , ^ the
Home Guard was made compulsory for all men not in some
1a Q
branch of service*
The drafting of men and women for in
dustry was also enlarged to the extent that on March 14, all
men between ages forty-six and fifty and all women twenty and
twenty-one, were ordered to register for service* 109 It was
estimated that approximately 20,000 men and a slightly
larger number of girls would register* 110

These people

would be diverted to defense work of some type in order that
war production would become more efficient* 111
The Evening Post (Wellington), March 25, 1942, p*
6* Married men between the ages eighteen and forty-six,
without children, and men eighteen to twenty-eight, with chil
dren, were conscripted* When these men were trained, mobi
lized forces would be 155,132, excluding the 100,000 Home
Guardsmen. See Prime Minister to New Zealand Minister,
Washington, Document 209, March 13, 1942, in Documents, III,
241.
,f)A
^
New Zealand, Parilamentary Debates, CCLXX (1942),
*Q^The Evening Post (Wellington), March 14, 1942, p. 8.
110lbid.. March 17 , 19^2,

p. 65March 22, 19*12,

p. 6 .

111JPbid., March Ik, 1942, p. 8 .
Sports such as horse
rac ±n«or football were confined
to the time of day or week
when it would least affect the work of
the people* See Xbid*,
March 13, 1942, p. 6.
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Preparation Cor Allied relief centered around war
defense construction*

A Defense Construction Council was

organised to make sure that all defense works received
building priority*
were air bases*

112

Works receiving the highest priority

New Zealand was told that she would have to

prepare bases for 200 heavy bombers and 400 naval aircraft
which were coming in the near future* 113 Throughout the
early months

1942, despite the lack of heavy machinery,
New Zealand constructed new bases and enlarged others* 114
The imminent possibility of an invasion and th© ap
parent inability of the home forces to cope with it led to
a political crisis in the middle of March*

The Labour

Government was charged with being too lenient on the people,
not mobilizing the entire country for war* and not training
or arming th© troops a d e q u a t e l y M u c h of the criticism
centered around the Home Guard*

The opposition charged that*

while large numbers of men were recruited, there was such a
lack of equipment that the force was of little use*

No one,

according to the opposition, really believed that this force
would do much more than M * * • take up slack in a moment of
112Ibid., March 12, 1942, p. 8.
^ ^ P r i m e Minister to New Zealand Minister, Washington,
Document 209, March 13, 1942, in Documents * XXI, 239*
114 Ross, Air Force * p* 112*
115 For th© full debate see New Zealand, Parilamentary
Debates, CCLXI (1942), 88-181.
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11 g
emergency.*'

Other areas, such as giving the people too
much propaganda, 117 allowing the people to work a normal
forty-hour week, 118 and excessive domestic spending 119 were
also criticized by the National Party*

There was little

that the Labour Government could do to defend its program
but outline the progress made and give assurances that the
country could defend itself*

120

Zt was quite obvious, however, that the country could
not defend itself*

Thus, when the Prime Minister was in

formed in early April that 6,000 Americans would be dispatched
to New Zealand in early May,

121

he replied that he welcomed

the decision and was most anxious that everything be done to
accelerate assistance by the United States. 122

Resources and

manpower stretched almost to the limit, New Zealand anxiously
awaited the Americans*

On May 21, 1942, Vice Admiral R o b e r t L.

Ghormley, first Commander of the South Pacific area, arrived
in New Zealand* 123 He was soon followed by an advance party
Xl6Ibid., p. 124.
X

XX7Ibid.. pp. 92-93.

Ibid.. pp. 95-1X2.

XX9Ibid.. pp. 9 4 - 9 5 .
120

Zbid*, p. 120* No vote of confidence was taken
since it was, in most respects, a coalition government.
121

New Zealand Minister, Washington, to Prime Minister,
Document 224, April 9, 1942, in Documents * ZZZ, 26l*
122

Prime Minister to New Zealand Minister, Washington,
Document 225, April 11, 1942, Ibid., p. 26l.
123
Nash, Jk Working Democracy, p. 117.
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of 5,000 American soldiers.

124

A

On June 18 a complete Marine
125
division arrived in the Fiji Islands.
The long-awaited
American reinforcements had at last arrived.
12^Baker, New Zealand People at W a r , p. 73#
12^Prim© Minister to New Zealand Minister, Washington,
Document 226, June 18, 1942, in Documents, 111, 262.

CHAPTER V
REPRIEVE AND REALIGNMENT
The arrival of American troops did much to relax the
tension in New Zealand, but the possibility of invasion was
ever present.

At times the presence of American troops

added to New Zealand fears because they seemed oblivious
to the shortage of arms among the Dominion's defense forces.
The New Zealand forces and particularly the Air Force had
never been actually Included in any c o m m a n d T h i s made it
extremely hard to get any war material from the United
States.

New Zealand was eligible for iend-lease under terms

of the Anglo-British agreement and also an additional agree
ment that had been concluded separately by the New Zealand
2
Government and the United States, but requisition for materials still had to go through a long chain of command. 3
When Admiral Ghormley assumed command of the South Pacific
^Ross, Air Force, p. 109*
2u. S., Statutes at Large. L V I , Part 2, 611- 6 1 3 .
3

Ross, Air Force, p. 109* To get planes New Zealand
first had to go to the British Chiefs of Staff who had to
approve the requisition. Next the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
Washington had to approve it; from there it passed to the
Munitions Assignment Committee in Washington, who had to ap
prove all requisitions in the different theaters of war.
Next it passed to the Air Assignment Committee and then back
to the Munitions Committee for final approval.
90
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area with headquarters at Auckland, New Zealanders confi
dently expected to come under American command and receive
American supplies.

At the beginning Ghormley told them

that he was neither responsible for New Zealand defense nor
was he obligated to find the necessary materials to assure
adequate self-defense. 4 However, after three months of
negotiations with the United States, the Dominion's forces
were finally placed under Ghormley's command.
More difficulties arose when the United States pro
posed sending additional troops to the Fiji Islands.

These

troops were to be diverted from American units destined for
New Zealand, and would replace Dominion forces on the
Islands, 6 while New Zealand had hoped that troops of both
nations would fight side by side if the FIJI Islands were
7
invaded.
It was a disappointment when they were told that
withdrawal of the Dominion forces best suited the over-all
Pacific war effort*

Th© Americans, however, added that

perhaps the withdrawn troops could “• • • be made available
for amphibious training with . . .

/their/ 1st Marine Division

4Wood, Political and External Affairs, p. 244.
5Boss, Air Force, p. 127*
6
New Zealand Minister, Washington, to Prime Minister
of New Zealand, Document 281, May 6 , 1942, in Documents, Ill,
318• There were 10,000 troops in the Fiji Islands. See
Gillespie, The Pacific, pp. 50-51.
7

Prime Minister of New Zealand to New Zealand Minister,
Washington, Document 2 8 2 , May 7* 1942, in Documents, III,

318

.
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8

in anticipation of joint offensive action to the North. *'
New Zealand troops were transported home and became the
nucleus of a new force known as the 3rd Division* 9 This

new division was about to begin its amphibian assault train
ing when events changed the course of New Zealand defense*
The United States naval fleet had already fought one
major battle with the Japanese in the Pacific*

This action

in the Coral Sea, while seemingly a Japanese victory, had
kept the enemy from reinforcing New Guinea* 10 Anxious to
inflict a final major defeat upon the United States, the
Japanese pressed for another battle, on their terms* 11

Be

tween June 4 and June 7, 1942, the Battle of Midway raged
with a loss of four Japanese aircraft carriers and 250
planes*

12

This battle changed the course of the war, fori

8New Zealand Minister, Washington, to Prime Minister
of New Zealand, Document 304, June 24, 1942, Ibid*, p* 331*
^Gillespie, The Pacific, p* 53* The 3rd Division
was technically born May ll, 1942, and was formally called
the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Pacific*
These troops were never trained for amphibious assault but
became garrison troops*
lO One American aircraft carrier and two other ships
were destroyed by the Japanese* For details of the battle
see Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval
Operations in World War I X , Vol. X V i Coral Sea, Midway and
Submarine Actions * M a y . 1942— August, 1942 (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1950), pp. 33-64* Hereafter cited as
Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarines*
^Waters, The Navy, p. 2 8 8 .
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At one stroke the strategic situation in the Pacific
had been reversed* Shorn of a major part of her
hitherto predominant aircraft-carrier strength,
Japan had lost the initiative* The balance of
naval power in the Pacific was restored and thence
forth was to swing rapidly and heavily against
Japan* The threat to Hew Zealand and Australia
was definitely removed and in a few weeks the Allied. ~
forces passed to the offensive in the South Pacific* **
Fraser, heartened by the bright outlook, 14 soon
cabled General Freyberg for an estimate of reinforcements
needed in the Far East*

The Prime Minister informed the
General that as many as 2,500 men could be sent* 15
^ Freyberg

reported that 2,500 would hardly cover the losses sustained
in the last three months*

He recommended that 4,700 be sent
as a start in rebuilding the division* 16 On August 29, the
War Cabinet approved the dispatch of 5*500 men* 17
Changes were also made in the civil defense struc
ture*

The Emergency Precautions Scheme was completely

reorganized*

Instead of every city and hamlet maintaining

a completely Independent un i t , Hew Zealand was divided into
12

The Americans lost one aircraft carrier* For de
tails of the battle see Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and
Submarines, pp. 101-140*
13Waters, The Navy, p. 290.
14
.
The Evening Post (Wellington), June 8, 1942, p. 5*
15
^Army Headquarters, Wellington, to 2nd New Zealand
Expeditionary Force Headquarters, Document 64, August 5*
1942, in Documents, II, 46*
1A
General Freyberg to Chief of General Staff (Welling
ton), Document 6 5 * August 8, 1942, Ibid*, p* 48*
17Ibid., p. 48n.
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districts with each district containing a chapter y and a
ito
Civil. Defense Minister was placed over the entire body.
Although this change made it more efficient, some people
saw little use in the entire Scheme,

An editorial In The

Evening Post (Wellington) accused the Government of con
tinually complaining about manpower, but being unable to
see that the EPS was one of the reasons for the shortage.
The editorial advocated complete abandonment of the entire
19
organization.
The men who had Joined the Fire Protection
Scheme voiced the same sentiments when they argued that, in
view of the new situation in the Pacific, the body no longer
served. any purpose, 20
Manpower shortages 21 and the prospect of a major
Allied offensive in the Pacific, 22 prompted Fraser, in
10
Hew Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLXIX (1943)•
387.
19

The Evening Post (Wellington), August 29, 1942, p* 8,

2^Ibid., August 8, 1942, p, 8,
21

Women twenty-two and twenty-three were drafted to
work in industries because of manpower shortages. See Ibid,,
August 3* 1942, p, 4, The Army was also scrutinized to make
it more efficient. Jobs in the service that could be handled
by women were catalogued and women were placed in these Jobs
to allow men to serve in a more useful capacity.
See Ibid,,
September 3, 1942, p* 3• Even with the shortage of manpower
the Government still had to draft men. By October, 1942,
all men in the thirty-eight to forty-siac age group, regard
less of the number of children were being called to serve.
See Ibid,, October 13t 1942, p, 4,
22

The naval battle of Guadalcanal, fought November 1215» 1942, has been termed by Morison 11, , , decisive not
only in the struggle for the Island, but in the Pacific war
at large.” The Japanese failed to reinforce the island. This
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November, 1942, to ask Prime Minister Churchill if* New
Zealand troops could be withdrawn from the Middle Bast* 2 3
Fraser declared that New Zealand could not maintain two di
visions and continue to meet increased Allied war produc
tion demands at home*

Now that the Middle Eastern situation
looked comparatively safe,24 and due to the ever present
Japanese threat, it was '*• * . felt that the place of the
2nd New Zealand division • • • /waml here in the South
25
Pacific*f* x New Zealand became even more demanding when it
«mh

mm?

was learned that the Australian divisions were being witho£l
drawn to fight the Japanese*
Churchill, by pleading
shipping difficulties, shipping hazards, and finally stating
that the loss of Australian troops made the New Zealand division more important,27' succeeded in persuading the Labour
Government to keep the Expeditionary Force in the Middle
ultimately led to an American victory* For details see
Samuel Eliot Morlson, History of United States Naval Opera
tions in World War I X , Vol. V: The Struggle for Guadalcanal,
August, 1942— February* 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown and
Compiu^^
23 Prim© Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister of
United Kingdom, Document 176, November 19* 1942, in Documents,
II, 142-144.
24
Ibid*, p* 142* The victory at Alamein and Allied
landing® in French North Africa made the Middle East situa
tion look quite stable*
Z5Xb±d.. p. 144.
26

See Wood, Political and External Affairs, p. 249*

2^Prime Minister of United Kingdom to Prime Minister
of New Zealand, Document 179* December 2, 1942, in Documents,
II, 147.
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Bast*

oA

Australia disturbed with the decision, declared

" • • • the struggle in New Guinea • • .

Important im-

OQ
plications on the security of New Zealand * 11 7

Australian

troops were lighting there and according to the sister
Dominion, so should New Zealand forces.
The decision to maintain the 2nd Division in the
Middle East meant that other measures would have to be taken
to alleviate the shortages of workers*

The Government re

solved that a cut could be made in the home defense system*
Therefore, in December, 1942, Home Guard training was reduced
30 Further reducfrom twenty-four to eight hours per month•^
31
tions were ordered in February, 1943*
and on June 26, it
was announced that the Horae Guard would train twenty-four
hours per year* 32 Most of the Territorial force were taken
off mobilization standing and placed on reserve•3 3 By the
end of June, 1943* the entire defense force was a mere
20,000 men. 34 The Emergency Precautions Scheme was further
20

Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister of
United Kingdom, Document 101, December 4, 1942, Ibid*, p*
149.
29Prime Minister of Australia to Prime Minister of
New Zealand, Document 107, December 14, 1942, Ibid*, pp*
153*154.
^QThe Evening Post (Wellington), December 8 , 1942, p.
8*

~^ I b i d * * February 6 , 1943, P • 4.
3 2 Ibid., June 2 6 , 1943. P* 6 .
3 3 Xbid.

"^Gillespie, The Pacific, p. 109*
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reduced to small mobile units; 35 bomb shelter construction 36
and blackouts were stopped. 37
Still plagued with manpower problems and now forced
by political pressure to discontinue one of the divisions ,^
Fraser asked Churchill if he and Roosevelt could send a
joint telegram conveying to Parliament the need for the 2nd
Division in the European war.

This Churchill, in conjunctlon with Roosevelt, eloquently did. 39
^ Swayed by the same

worn-out arguments from the mother country, Parliament gave
its consent to retention of the division in the European
4o
theater.
This meant the end of a Pacific division.
The final decision concerning the 2nd Division was
accompanied by a furlough scheme whereby many veteran servicemen would be returned home for three months. 41 Troops were
needed to replace those on leave, so men from the now defunct
3rd Division, trained for jungle warfare, were sent to the
•^ T h e Evening Post (Wellington), February 27» 1943,
p. 4.
•^New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, CCLXIX (1943),

387- 388.

37Xbid.. p. 387.
Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister of
United Kingdom, Document 222, April 29, 1943, in Documents,
II. 189.
^ P r i m e Minister of United Kingdom to Prime Minister
of New Zealand, Document 237, April 21, 1943, Ibid., p. 210.
40
Prime Minister of New Zealand to Prime Minister of
United Kingdom, Document 239, May 17, 1943, Ibid. , p. 211.
^ W o o d , Political and External Affairs, p. 260.
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European theater*

42

At the end of* the three months the fur

loughed men were to go back, but after working and enjoying
a peaceful life, they refused* 43 The Government could do
nothing, for:
In the face of an angry public and demonstrations
among the men themselves it proved impossible either
to force the men to join the ships or to punish them
for their refusal to do so* The impressive array of
emergency powers at the disposal of the government
were proved to count for nothing when confronted with
determined opinion and action* By the end of 1943,
the episode showed the war was over as far as the
average citizen*s immediate awareness was concerned*
^ 2 Ibid* See also William Hosking Oliver, The Story
of New Zealand (London: Faber and Faber, 19^0), p. 2 6 6 •
^Oliver, The Story of New Zealand, p* 206#
44 Ibid*

CONCLUSION
New Zealand, traditionally the most loyal and depen*
dent of the British Commonwealth countries, sought to
maintain this distinction throughout the critical years of
the war*

This time-honored policy of looking at the world

through British eyes led to confusion in conducting the war
and in matters of defense*

Some Labour politicians seemed

to talk of independence in policy-making, but still talked
of allegiance to Britain in almost the same breath, while
other officials, especially military leaders, were willing
to assess the situation and plan to meet the danger*

Gen

erally the latter were overshadowed by British opinion and
were often criticized for not following the experienced
judgment of greater powers*

Leaders of the Labour Party,

anxious to have their policies implemented with as little
opposition as possible, often used British policies and
recommendations as the final justifying argument*
It seems clear that New Zealand relied too heavily
on collective security in planning for the defense of the
nation*

The sending of all of her elite troops to England

and the Middle East during the first year of the war can be
justified, but, as the Japanese threat became increasingly
obvious, the continuation of this policy with only a poorly-

99

100

trained force of Territorials and Home Guardsmen— men unfit
for overseas service— to man home defenses, is difficult to
understand*

Total reliance on Britain and a concentrated

effort to please the mother country would seem the only
plausible answer*
fense*

Singapore was the key to New Zealand de

New Zealanders were led to believe that the island

fortress was impregnable and, thus, were convinced that the
Japanese would be stopped*

As long as Singapore was there

and the British promised a fleet to protect the South Pacific,
the Dominion felt reasonably safe*

In order to send such a

fleet, however, Britain must also be secure at home; so time
and again, the statement "If Britain fell the Dominion would
be helpless*1 is used to justify Mew Zealand's sending more
men and materials to the European theater*

Even during the

crucial months just before the attack on Pearl Harbor, when
a few people were beginning to he skeptical about such a
defense posture, the soothing words of Churchill, plus the
glowing reports of the exploits of the New Zealand Expedition
ary Force, which appeared regularly in New Zealand newspapers,
served to satisfy the bulk of New Zealanders*
The brief periods of independent action and the several
blunt statements made by the Labour Government concerning
British foreign policy during the war can be attributed
largely to frustration*

Britain failed to supply many of the

weapons promised, and seemed unable or unwilling to realize
the Dominion's precarious position*

New Zealand, increasingly
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aware of the fact that she must search elsewhere for help,
attempted to establish stronger relations with the United
States, but was hampered by the jealousy of the mother country*
Desperate for assistance and anxious to play a larger role
in planning the strategy of the Pacific war, the Dominion
boldly formed and exerted her own opinion on certain strate
gical issues*

Bernard Gordon, in his book New Zealand

Becomes ex Pacific Power, maintains that, because of this de
fiant action, New Zealand emerges from the war as a new
power in the Pacific with a definite national foreign policy*
This is somewhat hard to justify*

New Zealand, by allowing

her troops to remain in the European theater Instead of with
drawing them to fight the Japanese, revealed that she was
content to oppose only in words— not in action— and thus lost
the chance of measurably gaining political power in Pacific
relations immediately after the war*

Foundations for build

ing an Independent foreign policy, laid before the war, most
assuredly were made firmer as a result of the conflict, but
it is highly questionable to assume that New Zealand had
cast off her title of "the most loyal of the Dominions*”
One must conclude that New Zealand's position in the
conflict is somewhat unique— a South Pacific country sending
her elite troops to fight an enemy more than 12,000 miles
away, while Japan, the obvious foe, appears about to invade
the homeland*

New Zealand should have demanded and with

drawn her forces from Europe to protect herself and to help

102
her Pacific Allies defeat the Japanese*

Despite the many

explanations given for not doing so, the primary reason was
that New Zealand still looked at the world with British
eyes and still sought the praise of the mother country*
The lesson in geography, almost disastrously taught by the
Japanese, seemed to make few immediate impressions on the
century-old traditions of New Zealanders*

APPENDIX
SECRETARIES OF STATE AMD GOVKRHORS GEHERAIi

1955— 1943*
The initials SSDA represent Secretary of State for
Dominion Affairs*

The Secretaries of State during the war

were:
January 28, 1939 — September 3* 1939— Viscount Caldecote
(then Sir Thomas Inship)
September 3, 1939— May 12, 1940— Anthony Eden
May 12, 1940— -October 3, 1940— Viscount Caldecote
October 3, 1940— February 19* 1942— Viscount Cranbrone
February 19, 194-2— September 28, 194-3— Clement At lee
September 28, 194-3— August 3* 194-3— Viscount Cranbrone
August 3, 1945— October 7, 194-7— Viscount Addison
The initials GGHZ represent Governor General of Hew
Zealand*

The Governors General were:

1935-1941— Viscount Galway (died March 27, 194-3)
1941-1946— Marshall of the Air Force, Sir Cyril Hawaii
♦

Hew Zealand. War History Branch. Department of In
ternal Affairs, Documents Relatiy to Hew Zealand^ Partici
pation in the Second World War^( 3 vols.: Wellington: War
SI story firanch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1939—63),
III, In*
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